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FIXTURES-UNIFORMITY IN
WORDS OR IN FACT?
PETE F. CooGAN t*
I. THE PROBLEM
In the three years since this author first raised questions in The
Harvard Law Review as to whether the fixture provisions of article
nine (sections 9-401 (1) and 9-313) of the Uniform Commercial Code
adequately expressed the rules which they seemed to establish concern-
ing perfection and priority of fixture security interests,1 two states
have rejected the principal priority section (9-313) (Ohio, 2 in spirit,
and California,' in its entirety), and several other states have found
it necessary to alter the language of section 9-401 (1) which deals with
fixture filing.4  The editorial board of the national sponsors has
asked three members (including this writer) ' of the article nine sub-
committee to consider whether some modifications of article nine's
fixture provisions are advisable. Each of these three shares some re-
sponsibility for not having fully appreciated the scope of the fixture
t LL.M. 1942, Harvard University. Visiting Lecturer, Yale Law School. Mem-
ber, Massachusetts Bar.
* The opinions expressed in this article are the personal opinions of the author
only and do not necessarily reflect the thinking of any sponsors' committee of which
he is a member. Contributions to the author's thinking were made by members of
seminars recently given at the Harvard and Yale Law Schools and by the present
and past members of the staff of this Review. Special mention should be made of the
contributions on the Massachusetts material by Charles Normandin, LL.B. Harvard,
1963 and on the Pennsylvania material by Jerome R. Verlin, LL.B. University of
Pennsylvania, 1964. This article will be published as a chapter in COOGAN, HOGAN
& VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS.
ISecurity Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 HARv.
L. REV. 1319 (1962), reprinted with additional material in COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS,
2 SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ch. 17 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as SECURED TRANSACTIONS].
2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.32 (Page Supp. 1964). For the history, see
Hollander, Imperfections in Perfection of Ohio Fixture Liens, 14 W. REs. L. REV.
683 (1963); Pfeiler, Uniform Commercial Code-Adverse Effect on Real Estate
Mortgages, 29 LEGAL BULLETIN U.S. SAVINGS & LOAN LEAGUE 201 (1963).
3 The Uniform Commercial Code was approved by the Governor, June 8, 1963,
effective January 1, 1965. Concerning reasons for the rejection, see the various docu-
ments reprinted as SENATE FACT FINDING CoMMrrTEE ON JUDICIARY, SIXTH PROGRESS
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE (1961). See, e.g., id. at 576-78.
4 The principal variations are collected in RFoRT No. 2 OF TIE PERMANENT
EDITORIAL BOARD FoR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT ON VARIATIONS TO
CODE IN ADOPTING STATES §§ 9-313, 9-401 (1) (b). See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §§ 9-313, 9-401 (1) (b).
The other members are Professor Grant Gilmore, who was associated with the
drafting of article nine from the beginning (but who did not draft either the original
or the revised version of § 9-313) and Homer Kripke, Esquire, who also participated
from an early date in the deliberations on article nine.
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problem when section 9-313 was redrafted in 1956; 0 each has recently
attempted to enlist the thinking of others by discussing the problem in
professional journals7 and otherwise.'
The problem has proven no less difficult than important. If ob-
taining a security interest in fixtures were an uncommon transaction,
some lack of clarity in the Code's fixture rules might be permitted as a
minor defect in an otherwise generally sound statute. However, a
question of whether or not the Code's fixture provisions apply occurs
every time an owner of an old house buys on secured credit a new
furnace,9 a new oil burner,'0 or a new kitchen sink," or when he adds
storm windows to the house.'" Fixture problems exist any time that
a real estate construction mortgagee finances the construction of a
house to which the owner adds plumbing or heating equipment financed
by or through its vendor '--and again when an interest in that house
is later created by way of a purchase or a mortgage.' 4 The concept of
fixtures is also important whenever a manufacturing plant adds goods
bought under conditional sales contracts or other secured credit arrange-
ments if those goods are somehow "affixed" or "attached" to the
realty; '" and at least in some states, even when the goods so purchased,
though not physically affixed, are necessary for the operation of the
industrial plant (for example, beer kegs which go in and out of a
brewery 1). Furthermore, these same questions apply when a tenant
buys on secured credit any of the articles previously mentioned.
Fixture interests generally arise from some type of purchase money
or conditional sale transaction, and little attention will be given here
to the rare transaction under section 9-313 (2) which does not involve
61956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDIToRrAL BoARD FOR Tim UNIFORM COlmMECIAL
CODE 290-91 (1957). The present text of § 9-313 appeared in the 1957 official edition
and all subsequent editions.
7 Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 HLA'Rv. L. REv. 1333 (1963) ; Kipke,
Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 COLUm. L. REV. 44 (1964).
S The members of the fixture subcommittee have considered the problem in panel
discussions with lawyers from many states. See, e.g., 1963 PROCEEDINS OF THE REAL
ESTATE SEcrioN OF ABA CONVENTION (remarks of Messrs. Coogan and Kripke).
9 See, e.g., Holland Furnace Co. v. Suzik, 118 Pa. Super. 405, 180 Atl. 38 (1935).
10 See, for example, a discussion of the New Jersey "institutional doctrine cases"
in Communication and Study Relating to Conditional Sales of Fixtures, in NEW YoRK
LAw RmsIo CoMMIssION REPORT 671, 680-98 (1942).
11 Compare Walker Dishwasher Corp. v. Medford Trust Co., 279 Mass. 33, 180
N.E. 517 (1932), with Bainway v. Cobb, 99 Mass. 457 (1868).
12 See, e.g., Mass. Acts & Resolves 1937, ch. 245, at 281, as amended, Mass. Acts
& Resolves 1943, ch. 52, at 46, as amended, Mass. Acts & Resolves 1956, ch. 160, at 89.
13 See Gilmore, supra note 7, at 1367, 1398; Shanker, A Further Critique of the
Fixture Section of the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL &
CoMMERCI L L. REv. 61, 65 (1964).
14 UNIFORM CoMMERcIAL. CODE § 9-313(4).
15 5 AmmuAIc LAvw OF PROPERTY § 19.12 (Casner ed. 1952). See generally id.
§§ 19.1-.14.
16First Natl Bank v. Reichneder, 371 Pa. 463, 91 A.2d 277 (1952).
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a purchase money interest" or the equally rare situation covered by
subsection (3).' When a vendor insists on retaining a purchase
money security interest in particular goods, he indicates that he is
unwilling to sell to the debtor unless he can retain the right to remove
the goods if the debtor does not complete his payments, and in this
way the vendor hopes to get back at least part 19 of his money by other-
wise disposing of the collateral. This means that he must be able to
remove his collateral over the objections of any other secured party who
has acquired an interest in it. Collateral which is tangible only in the
sense that it is embodied in, or evidenced by, a piece of paper, and
many tangible kinds of goods as well, never become part of the realty
on which they happen to be located. The right to remove this type of
collateral is not affected by the acquisition of rights in the realty.
On the other hand, sometimes business equipment or consumer goods
are so used by the debtor that, even though sold on secured credit and
not yet paid for, rights therein arise in favor of the holder of a present
or future interest in the real estate of which they become a part. The
Code divides collateral which somehow became a part of the realty into
two classes and provides drastically different treatment for each class.
(1) If the goods become incorporated into a structure, no security
interest, and hence no right to remove, under article nine can survive; 20
but (2) if the goods have become fixtures, a right to remove can be
preserved by one who satisfies the fixture provisions of the Code.
21
To the natural question of when its fixture provisions apply, the Code
responds only that they apply to goods which are or will become
fixtures. Not only does the Code fail to define fixtures, but there is no
37 The typical fixture security interest will be a purchase money security interest
which falls under subsection (2). It is theoretically possible for a debtor who already
owns an item which has not yet been affixed to create a nonpurchase money mortgage
thereon and give to a secured party under § 9-313(2) a priority over earlier realty
interests. This corresponds roughly to the priority given to purchase money interests
of nonfixtures over earlier chattel filers through compliance with § 9-312(4). The
writer would agree with Professor Gilmore that on balance the priorities given to
fixtures by §9-313(2) should be there limited to purchase money interests, as they
usually are in fact. Gilmore, supra note 7, at 1388-89.
Is Section 9-313(3) provides a mechanism through which a debtor who does not
own the real estate upon which a fixture is located can create a security interest even
after the goods have been affixed. He must, however, get consent of all holders of
interests in the realty. Thus this is a method of making a severance agreement effec-
tive against future purchasers by a fixture filing. Perhaps its greatest value is in pro-
viding a mechanism by which one who takes a nonpurchase money security interest
in borderline collateral can by consent and double filing protect himself against a later
claim that the goods were fixtures. Subsection (3) may also be useful in states
where banking laws, for example, make it decidedly easier to create a security interest
under chattel law than under real estate law.
19 Removal damages under § 9-313(5) may further reduce the secured party's net
recovery.
2 oUNIFORM CoMMRCI. L CODE § 9-313(1) (first sentence).
21 UNnoR COMM.ERCIA. CODE §§ 9-313, 9-401(1) (b).
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generally accepted non-Code meaning of the word.2" A would-be
conditional vendor therefore has the difficult problem of determining
at the time of the sale of equipment or consumer goods whether or not
the purchase price can be secured under any Code rules, and if the
answer is yes, whether he should proceed to protect his interest by
complying with the rules applicable to fixtures or those applicable to
nonfixtures. For purposes of this discussion, we shall use the term
fixtures as though it described a class of collateral. Actually the ques-
tion to be decided by the conditional vendor is more abstract, i.e., into
which of three sets of rules will his transaction fall:
A. The rule of the first sentence of section 9-313(1) is that if the
goods to be conditionally sold will be "incorporated into a structure"
which is realty, the conditional vendor can retain no chattel security in-
terest in them regardless of the number of times and places he files or
records under article nine. In the eyes of the law these former chattels
have been completely merged into the realty, and in practice they will
have more or less completely lost their former chattel identity. In a rare
case perhaps the conditional vendor may be able to obtain an agreement
which allows him to sever the collateral on default, but this must be
done by executing and filing a severance agreement under the generally
more burdensome requirements of real estate law.23 Otherwise, the
vendor must rely on the debtor's unsecured promise to pay, or get
what assurance he can through a real estate mortgage or a mechanic's
or supplier's lien " on the entire real estate including the newly added
goods (in either case a claim usually inferior to an existing real estate
mortgage). Bricks built into a chimney, plaster added to a wall or
ceiling, lumber built into the outside of a house are clear examples of
goods "incorporated into a structure" in which no Code security inter-
est may be retained. We may call such goods "A goods" or "straight
realty." As we shall see, in pre-Code cases even these A goods are
2 2 Dictionaries do not provide much help in defining a fixture, see, e.g., BLACK,
LAW DICTIoNARY (4th ed. 1951); WnsER, INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY (1961),
and common usage of the term includes many items not affixed to the real estate or
within the purview of a fixture conditional sales statute (for example, fixtures in a
shoe store might include such wholly removable objects as foot stools, portable x-ray
equipment, portable showcases, and the like). We may note in passing that article
two pointedly avoids the use of the term fixtures "because of the diverse definitions
of this term." UNIFORM CoMMFRCrA'- CODE § 2-107, comment 2. Article nine followed
this policy until the present form of § 9-313 was redrafted in 1956. See 1956 REcOm-
MENDATIONS OF THE EDrIORAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 290-91
(1957). Section 9-313 does not use the term "part of the realty," but the phrase was
used in the pre-19 56 drafts of § 9-313, and similar language was used in its predecessor,
§ 7 of the UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT (USCA).
23 The term "severance agreement!' is used to indicate an instrument executed
and recorded in accordance with applicable real estate law, whereby one to whom the
property would normally fall by way of accession agrees that a particular item may
be severed from the real estate.
24 See Shanker, supra note 13, at 67-68.
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sometimes referred to as "fixtures," 2" but for clarity we confine the
term "fixture" (as does the Code in effect) to the C goods described
below.
B. The rules of article nine govern security interests in un-
affixed goods, such as chairs and typewriters, which are legally and
factually independent of the real estate on which they happen to be
located and may be referred to as "straight personalty or chattels."
Clearly the objections of any holder of the real estate are ineffective in
preventing the removal of these B goods. This is true whether or not
there has been any fixture filing.26
C. The Code's special fixture filing rules (section 9-401(1) (b))
and the rules which govern perfection and priority of security interests
in fixtures (section 9-313) apply to goods whose association with
realty is closer than that referred to in B (straight personalty or
chattels), but not so close as the association referred to in A (incor-
porated into a structure which is realty). While A goods become a
"part of the realty" for all purposes and B goods do not become part
of the realty for any purpose, fixtures become part of the realty for
some purposes (as their name indicates, they are affixed), but retain
their identity and are capable of being converted back into chattels
with relative ease. So far as article nine is concerned, fixtures can be
removed from the realty against the wishes of the real estate interests
only by a secured party who meets the double conditions of section
9-313(5)-that he has acquired the requisite "priority," and that he
satisfies the duty to repair certain types of damage caused by the
removal.
In all cases under article nine, a fixture-secured party has the
proper priority if he has made a proper and timely filing in the realty
records." If a fixture security interest attached before the goods were
affixed, and no interest in the realty is purchased between the time of
affixation and the time of removal, the fixture secured party has the
necessary priority to remove even if he has made no fixture filing; but,
as a practical matter, a fixture filing is always necessary because the
secured party's right to remove is lost if after affixation and prior to
his filing, any interest in the realty is "purchased" (which in the Code
includes an advance under an earlier or subsequent mortgage, or a lien
25 See, e.g., Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853).
2 6 Failure to file even in the chattel records would create no rights in one claiming
under real estate law, but would be material if one who later purchases the realty
also purchases this particular property as personalty.
2 7 UNIFORM CoMMmaciAL CoDE §§ 9-401(1) (b), 9-302(1) (c), 9-302(d).
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created by legal proceedings) .m A prudent conditional vendor must
assume that between the time of affixation and the time of removal
there will be some such purchase.
The secured party's right to remove his fixtures is not diminished
by the fact that some physical or economic damage to the goods or the
remaining realty is caused by removal (or that the value of some real
estate interest is thereby decreased), and the remover's duty to repair
is confined to repairing physical damage done to the remaining realty
by removal.29
To state these principal fixture rules of the Code is simple, but to
apply them to an item of collateral to be used in a certain manner in
connection with certain real estate is often extremely difficult. While
section 9-313 seems to establish its own rules as to what is a fixture-
that is, what is removable by one who satisfies the conditions of its
subsection ( 5 )-the second sentence of subsection (1) looks the other
way: "The law of this state other than this Act determines whether
and when other goods [in other words, goods other than those incor-
porated into a structure] become fixtures." In some states there are
cases which will support any conclusion a fact-finder may reach as to
what class of goods a particular item of collateral is, and some of
these cases are inconsistent with the apparent policy of section 9-313.
For example, a household furnace attached or affixed in what
appears to be the same manner may in one case fall into category A,
in another into category B, and in still another into category C.30
A wrong guess by the conditional vendor may make his security
interest worthless. If the conditional vendor guesses that the item
of goods added by him has become a fixture-category C-and it is
later determined to have remained a chattel--category B--even though
he has filed in the fixture records, the collateral may be sold free and
clear to a chattel purchaser who takes it without knowledge, or it may
2 8Umyom ComacALI CODE §§9-313(3), 9-313(4), 9-301. For brevity in this
discussion I use the all-inclusive word "purchaser" with respect to interests in real
estate as § 1-201(32) uses it with respect to personalty.
2 9 UN3:O ComimCLcL CoDE § 9-313(5).
30 See Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Say. & Loan Co., 135 Ohio St. 48, 19
N.E.2d 273 (1939); XXth Century Heating v. Homeowners Loan Corp., 56 Ohio
App. 188, 10 N.E.2d 229 (1937). Compare Gardner v. Buckley & Scott, Inc., 280
Mass. 106, 181 N.E. 802 (1932), with Gar Wood Indus., Inc. v. Colonial Homes, Inc.,
305 Mass. 41, 24 N.E.2d 767 (1940). If the court in Holland Furnace Co. v. Suzik,
118 Pa. Super. 405, 180 Atl. 38 (1935), decided only that the secured party's interest
was unprotected because he did not file his collateral as a fixture, the opinion is unduly
wasteful of words.
These results are by no means peculiar to household furnaces. Compare Coin-
mercial Credit Corp. v. Commonwealth Mortgage & Loan Co., 276 Mass. 335, 177
N.E. 88 (1931), Woith Commercial Credit Corp. v. Gould, 275 Mass. 48, 175 N.E. 264
(1931), involving the same type of installation in Massachusetts of a domestic refrig-
eration system discussed at pp. 1209-10 infra.
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be attached by one who obtains a lien by legal process 31 on it as
personalty, and a trustee in bankruptcy can succeed to the rights of
such a creditor. Even if no such creditor exists, the trustee may
represent a hypothetical creditor of any one of the Code's three classes.3"
If a filing is made in the chattel records, and the goods are later deter-
mined to have become fixtures-category C-the security interest is
not good against a subsequent purchaser of the realty, 3 nor one who
obtains a lien on the realty by legal process; "' and again the door is
opened to attack by the trustee in bankruptcy 3 representing either the
real or hypothetical creditor or purchaser."6
It has been argued that, however defective section 9-313 may be in
theory, the defect is of little consequence because there is a practical
answer: Let the secured party who is doubtful as to whether he has a
"fixture" simply file his collateral both as a fixture and as a chattel.
Such double filing does give the secured party protection if the collateral
is ultimately held to fall into category B or category C. However, so
long as it is not possible to distinguish clearly between goods which
have become incorporated into the realty (A) and those which are
Code fixtures (C), he runs the chance that even with double filing he
may get no protection because the goods may be held to have been in-
corporated into the realty. A number of pre-Code cases in states which
had adopted section 7 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (UCSA)
(for example, Pennsylvania 3 and New Jersey ') held that even goods
affixed in such a way that they were physically removable without
significant damage to themselves or to the realty from which they were
severed had nonetheless become nonremovable parts of the realty, and
hence not subject to the fixture filing rules of the predecessor of section
9-313, USCA's section 7."o The prime difficulty with section 9-313
is that a too literal reading of the last two sentences of section 9-313 (1)
may lead a court into recognizing life in these old decisions-and their
counterparts in non-UCSA states-which section 9-313 as a whole is
meant to supersede. In the majority of Code states, the UCSA was
31 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301.
32See discussion of bankruptcy aspects in 2 SEcuRED TRANSACTIONS, chs. 16-17,
at 1681-1817.
33A secured creditor cannot assume that the bona fide purchaser test applicable
under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat 869 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96
(1958), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96(d) (Supp. V, 1964), will not apply to fixtures.
3 4 UNIFORM COMcmIA CODE § 9-313 (4).
3 See note 32 supra.
36 See note 33 m.pra.
38 See pp. 1200-01 infra.
38 See p. 1219 infra.
39 The text of § 7 of UCSA in its recommended form will be found at note
154 infra.
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never in force, and it is impossible to determine from many pre-Code
cases whether the court is saying that the goods in question would
fall under what we have called the A rules or the C rules.
If section 9-313 is unsatisfactory to the chattel secured party, it
does not follow that it is acceptable to real estate interests. Uncer-
tainty as to the rights of chattel secured parties is matched by un-
certainty as to the rights of holders of realty interests. One who
purchases an interest in the realty after affixation should be able to learn
from the real estate record of the existence of fixture security interests
to which he takes subject. So long as there is no reasonably clear
method of determining what becomes a nonremovable part of the
realty (A), what remains personal property (B), and what becomes
a fixture (C), a real estate purchaser may be defeated in his reasonable
expectation that, in the absence of any filing on the record, he obtained
unencumbered title to the furnace or any other similar item on his
vendor's premises. Real estate interests were in fact the first to object
to section 9-313 as a whole, primarily because of its ambiguity (though
later, their objections were directed more specifically against section
9-313(2) which enables a fixture-secured party to remove fixtures
added by him, as against the protests of an earlier real estate
mortgagee '0).
The problem of redrafting the Code's fixture sections is not merely
a matter of making the changes necessary to distinguish between dif-
ferent types of goods and altering the troublesome sentence which
permits the states to follow their pre-Code law. There is an under-
lying conflict as to what the substantive rules of fixture security law
should be. Some real-estate-minded counsel have suggested that other
states should follow Ohio's lead in reversing the policy of the Code's
most essential fixture priority provision-section 9-313(2). 41 Ohio's
new Code fixture provisions (like the Massachusetts fixture statute 4
repealed by the Code) give an earlier real estate mortgagee an absolute
veto power over his debtor's ability to finance the purchase of a new
fixture through a fixture purchase money transaction. If the condi-
tional vendor does not obtain the earlier mortgagee's consent to a
fixture purchase money interest, he loses his collateral and contributes
a windfall to the mortgagee. Under the Ohio version of the Code,
all fixture interests, whether they attached before or after affixation,
can be protected only against future purchasers of interests in the real
estate. While theoretically the debtor can obtain the prior real estate
40 See pp. 1212-13 infra.
41 See p. 1214 infra.
42 Mass. Acts & Resolves 1937, ch. 245, at 281, as amended, Mass. Acts & Resolves
1943, ch. 52, at 46, as amended, Mass. Acts & Resolves 1956, cL. 160, at 89.
1194 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.113:1186
mortgagee's consent or obtain the purchase price through a junior
encumbrance upon the realty as a whole, the earlier real estate mort-
gagee has the practical power to force financing through his existing
mortgage or not at all.
An Ohio professor 3 who disapproved of the Ohio amendment
has suggested a position that strikes a compromise of sorts between
the Code and the Ohio policy. Under this approach the debtor is
allowed to purchase fixtures on secured credit without consent of an
earlier realty mortgagee (but with notice required); however, the
conditional vendor does not have the right to remove his fixture on
the debtor's default, but must be satisfied with a lien corresponding
more nearly to the traditional "mechanic's lien." '
There is agreement among members of the fixture drafting com-
mittee that the basic policy underlying the Code's fixture provisions is
preferable both to the Ohio and to the "mechanic's lien" alternatives,
and this view seems to be shared by most students of the problem.
Perhaps it is for this reason that there is a body of opinion that prefers
section 9-313 in its present form to any modified version. The
argument is that the Code's fixture philosophy and mechanics fit fairly
well into the existing fixture law of the states which adhere to the
"majority" " view as to fixtures, and it is hoped that courts of the
states which follow the "minority" view will reach the result which
was envisaged by the draftsmen of section 9-313, whether or not their
intention was expressed as well as it might have been.
This approach is not wholly inconsistent with the view this writer
has expressed elsewhere ' (and is restated here at a later point 47) that
a court which is intent upon finding the meaning of section 9-313 can
do so in spite of the muddy language of that section. The line which
determines what is and what is not a Code fixture has much in common
43 Professor Shanker first expressed his thoughts on Code fixture problems in
An Integrated Financing System for Purchase Money Collateral: A Proposed Solu-
tion to the Fixture Problem Under Section 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
73 YALE L.J. 788 (1964).
44 Id. at 803-05.
45 This writer would find it difficult to classify into a majority or minority any
states whose fixture law he has had occasion to probe at any length. New Jersey and
Massachusetts, for example, started out on diametrically opposite paths. Campbell v.
Roddy, 44 N.J. Eq. 244, 14 Atl. 279 (Ct. Err. & App. 1888), is often cited for the
proposition that the conditional vendor's rights are superior to those of an earlier real
estate mortgagee, while Clary v. Owen, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 522 (1860), is often
cited as the source of the conservative view that the earlier real estate mortgagee
has the superior interest. But the reasoning of Smyth Sales Corp. v. Norfolk Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n, 116 N.J.L. 293, 184 Atl. 204 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936) sounds curiously
similar to General Heat & Appliance Co. v. Goodwin, 316 Mass. 3, 54 N.E.2d 676
(1942). Labels are notoriously unreliable as a means of predicting what a court will
hold on a fixture question.
46 See 2 Sacuax TAxsAclorNs § 16.07.
47 See pp. 1222-25 infra.
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with the description by a Vermont farmer of the broken-down fence
around his cow pasture: "It will let the cow know when she has
come to the end of the pasture, if she wants to know." A perusal of
the many attempts at solving the difficult problem of determining when
and what goods may or may not be removed by an unpaid conditional
vendor may raise legitimate doubts as to whether all of the courts will
sufficiently "want to know" where the line is." There ought to be a
better way for courts-and more important, for practicing lawyers-to
ascertain the category into which his transaction falls. No court will
decide what a particular provision of section 9-313 means until a case
involving that point comes before it, perhaps a decade or two hence; "
in the meantime, practitioners will be called on thousands of times to
guess what a court in the applicable state will hold.5"
Each of the members of the sponsors' subcommittee on fixtures
has independently arrived at the conclusion that while the basic con-
cepts of section 9-313 are workable and desirable, some improvement
is called for in the language. These points need not be rehashed here.5
It is this writer's thesis that in addition to making certain clarify-
ing changes in the language of section 9-313, we must continue to seek
a solution better than that offered either by the Code or by its
predecessor, the UCSA, in enabling a conditional vendor or his
counsel to determine which of the three sets of rules listed previously
is applicable to a contemplated transaction. The principal drafting
problem is essentially this: (x) Is it possible-or even desirable-to
define the term "fixture" in article nine or to otherwise circumscribe
in article nine the area over which the fixture filing rules of section
9-401 and the removal rules of section 9-313 (5) 2 are to control with-
out reference to some "other law" of each adopting state; or (y) On
the contrary, should we leave section 9-313 as it is and hope that
4 8 ore pressing is the question as to whether a court with a backlog of untried
automobile cases has as much time as has the cow to determine where the line was
intended to be drawn.
49 For example, Massachusetts conditional vendors did not learn until almost
twenty years later that a statute dealing with conditional sales of certain goods wrought
into the real estate, first enacted in 1912, protected only against future mortgagees. See
Greene v. Lampert, 274 Mass. 386, 174 N.E. 669 (1931) ; Waverly Co-operative Bank
v. Haner, 273 Mass. 477, 173 N.E. 699 (1930).
50 Some rules of law only indirectly influence choice of one's conduct. A did not
stand in front of B's boiler because he thought that if it should explode the jury would
find B liable; nor did B neglect to sufficiently maintain that boiler because he thought
the jury would reach the opposite conclusion. But in commercial transactions each
of the parties frequently has the choice of refusing to proceed, and the rules must
enable the parties to choose intelligently.
51 See 2 SEcuRED TRANSACTIONS 1681-1817; Gilmore, supra note 7; Kripke, =pra
note 7; and Shanker, A Further Critique of the Fixture Section of the Uniform Com-
inercial Code, 6 BosToN COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL & CoMMERcIAL L. REV. 61 (1964).
52 The priorities under subsection (5) are of course governed by subsections (2),
(3), and (4), and these in turn tie in with the filing rules of § 9-401 (1) (b).
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practitioners and judges will determine that its face was intended to
be turned towards the new set of rules and the underlying philosophy
embodied in section 9-313 as a whole rather than towards some pre-
Code law?
When the UCSA was drafted, some commercially important states
(including New York and Ohio) required filing for most conditional
sales and other states equally important, including California, Illinois
and Massachusetts, did not. It could have been argued that the latter
states had decided against filing on the basis of social policy, and it
could not be said that the nonfiling rule had worked too badly. The
draftsmen of the UCSA apparently felt no need to preserve the two
differing systems, and for the sake of uniformity imposed the filing
requirement. Had the decision been to leave each state to its prior
law, the departure from uniformity would at least have been made on
an intelligent basis.
However, in determining whether and when goods became subject
to fixture filing rules, the draftsmen adopted a filing requirement but
somehow felt a need to adhere to the pre-uniform law of each state.
Here there was no intelligible point of departure. When later the
draftsmen of the Code faced these same problems they adopted a
compromise on filing rules-filing was generally required, but the non-
filing exemption continued on a uniform basis for certain noncommer-
cial transactions.53 On the determination of when the fixture filing
rules apply, the Code followed the UCSA's example in leaving the
question to the varying historical answers found in the individual
adopting states.54 Apparently they thought that fixture law was
too closely related to realty law to enable a uniform act to override
past history.55 Hindsight now questions the soundness of an approach
which tied the Code to the history of fixtures in each adopting state
for two principal reasons: (1) Relying on states' historical definition
of fixtures relinquishes any hope for uniformity in fixture law of the
kind that has been established for most aspects of chattel financing;
and (2) A great many states have no rational basis for determining
for security purposes what is and what is not a fixture upon which a
uniform act can build, even in a nonuniform fashion."6 While it has
been suggested that every state has some law which determines when
5 3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302(1) (c), (d). Filing is never excused for
fixtures.
542A UNIFORM LAws ANOTATED 99 (1924).
55 Ibid.
56 Kripke, supra note 7, at 62; Shanker, An Integrated Financing System for
Purchase Money Collateral: A Proposed Solution to the Fixture Problem Under
Section 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 YALE L.J. 788, 794 (1964); see
discussion in part II infra.
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goods have become a part of the realty,57 and that this law would help
delineate the category the Code calls fixtures, non-Code law is un-
fortunately vague as to when goods used in close association with
certain realty fully retain their character as chattels and when they
become part of the realty.'
As long as the draftsmen of uniform acts tried to be faithful to
traditional concepts, as in the Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act,59 and
the UCSA, ° they obtained almost no adoptions for the first act, and
few for the second. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act (UTRA) was
less tied to the past, and far more widely adopted.6 The great strength
of article nine is derived largely from the willingness of its draftsmen to
discard much long-established chattel security law which had no sup-
port but history and to cast its rules along logical and functional lines.
Much of the nonfixture law proved to be sound and is carried over
into article nine; the senseless portions have been dropped. Also
dropped were many sensible and fully intelligible rules of particular
states which had to give way because they were in conflict with what
seemed on balance to be the better rule for uniform adoption. The
same policy must now be pursued with the Code's fixture provisions.
In the brief survey of pre-Code fixture law of selected states which
follows, we shall, among other things, examine the various questions
posed above, including the question as to whether a modification can
be made in fixture law which does not necessarily change some aspects
of the law of real estate.
II. Discussiow
A. Pennsylvania's Experience With Fixture Statutes
It is quite natural that the first questions concerning interpreta-
tions of section 9-313 should have come from the first state to have
adopted the Code, and it is equally fitting that those questions should
57 Goods incorporated into real estate which is not a structure are not excluded
under the first sentence of subsection (1) and hence, apparently, are removable
fixtures or even chattels. This makes some sense: for example an oil tank sunk into
the ground can be removed with damage only to the ground.
58 See discussion at pp. 1197-1220 infra.
59 For the text of the act see NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF ComIsSSlONERs ON
UNIFORM LAWS ANN. REP. 419 (1926). The Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act was
adopted only by Indiana. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS-
SIONERS ON UN noPm STATE LAws 266, 271 (1963).
60 The UCSA was adopted only in approximately a dozen states. See 2 UNIFORM
LAws ANNOTATED 7 (Supp. 1964). The breakdown of its fixture section was demon-
strated at any early date by Kleps, Uniformity Versus Uniform Legislation: Con-
ditional Sale of Fixtures, 24 CoR.NEL L.Q. 394 (1939).
61The UTRA was promulgated later than either of the other two uniform
security acts. Its acceptance was far wider. It was enacted in about forty states.
See 9C UNiFoRm LAws ANNOTATED 146 (Supp. 1964).
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have been raised in a soft voice. Pennsylvanians have been so proud
of having taken the plunge into the Code on faith while doubting
Thomases remained on the shore that their criticism of the Code on
any point has been muted. Moreover, the questions that were raised
did not lead to a demand for change in the Code's fixture provisions; 2
but this should not be taken as an indication that everything has run
smoothly in Pennsylvania. A brief outline of the state's peculiar
history of fixture security interest is necessary for a complete under-
standing of the problem.
Prior to 1915 Pennsylvania had no conditional sales act and
conditional sales were not allowed under the common law;0 3 nor did
it have any general chattel mortgage act.6 ' In most cases a non-
statutory bailment lease probably filled the gap left by the absence of
a conditional sales act.' In 1915 the legislature passed a statute which
provided for the recording of conditional sales of property attached or
to be attached to real property or chattels real. The most interesting
part of the statute was the second sentence of section 3, which says
that:
goods or chattels shall not, by reason of their being
attached to any real property or chattels real, become an
accession thereto; but shall be treated as severable, and sub-
ject to removal as against the conditonal vendee, . . . and
also as against all other persons having any interest in or
liens against such real property or chattels real, upon the
tender of a sufficient bond to all such persons holding prior
interests or liens against the same, conditioned for repairing
all damage caused by such severance and removal. 6
62 The two most important articles on Pennsylvania fixture law, did not call for
changes in the language of the Code in order to deal with the Pennsylvania problem.
See Leary, Financing New Machinery for Mortgaged Pennsylvania Inditstrial Plants,
4 ViLL. L. REv. 498 (1959); Robinson, McGough & Scheinholtz, The Effect of the
Uniform Commercial Code on the Pennsylvania Industrial Plant Doctrine, 16 U. PrT.
L. Rxv. 89 (1955).
63 See Leary, supra note 62, at 510-11.
64 The first chattel mortgage act was passed in 1945. Pa. Laws 1945, No. 434,
at 1358. See Robinson, McGough & Scheinholtz, supra note 62, at nn.35, 36.
65 See Montgomery, The Pennsylvania Bailnent Lease, 79 U. PA. L. RV. 920
(1931). As pointed out by HoNNoLD, SALES AND SALEs FINANCN G419 (1954), the
bailment lease was continued even after Pennsylvania adopted the UCSA.
06 Pa. Laws 1915, No. 386, § 3, at 867. See Ridgway Dynamo & Engine Co. v.
Werder, 287 Pa. 358, 135 Atl. 216 (1926), which gave priority to a conditional vendor
of mining equipment who had fully complied with the requirements of the 1915 act
over claims of a real estate mortgagee protected by an after-acquired-property clause.
The mortgagee had argued that, upon installation, the equipment had become part
of the real estate. See also Anchor Concrete Mach. Co. v. Pennsylvania Brick
& Tile Co., 292 Pa. 86, 140 Att. 766 (1928), in which the court held that the con-
ditional vendor's failure to comply with the requirements of the 1915 act precluded
replevin of the goods from a purchaser who took title from the conditional vendee
without knowledge of the conditional vendor's interest. Accord, in re Jacob F.
Thaler & Co., 1 F.2d 461 (W.D. Pa. 1924) ; In re Ulle-Light Hosiery Co., 13 Berks
247 (U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Pa. 1921) (opinion of referee).
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This language bears a resemblance to Canadian fixture legislation
which can be traced back to 1897.7
In 1923 some changes were made in the act " which, among other
things, combined the 1915 requirement that the remover pay the cost
of repairing the realty with the "material injury to the freehold" test
of section 7 of the UCSA (which Pennsylvania did not adopt until
two years later).
In 1925 the Pennsylvania legislature enacted its own version of
the UCSA and also further modified the 1915 act.09 Much of the
1915-1925 conditional sales law was reversed by excluding from the
definition of goods "machinery attached or to be attached to
real estate . . . ." I Two years later an amendment to the act
remedied some of the damage done by the 1925 act by excising the
exemption for machinery, and also by repealing the most recent version
of the modified 1915 act.71 These changes left Pennsylvania with a
version of the UCSA which was not the uniform act but which included
some of that act's ambiguities.
The 1915 act (like the 1935 act which was later patterned after
it) made no bow to any general law of Pennsylvania as to what was
a fixture, but stated directly in no uncertain terms: Goods attached to
realty may be removed by an unpaid conditional vendor, but the
remover must file under certain circumstances and must make good
any damage to the realty caused by removal. Neither the standard
version of section 7 of the UCSA nor any of the Pennsylvania versions
in effect between 1923 and 1935 were so clear cut. While it is possible
to cite sentences from the Commentaries of UCSA's draftsman which
107After the English courts decided against the chattel interests in Hobson v.
Gorringe, [1897] 1 Ch. 182 (1896), some Canadians feared that their previous case
law upholding the right of a conditional vendor to remove his fixtures might be
reversed. Ontario adopted legislation, Ontario Statutes 1897, 60 Vic., ch. 14 § 80:
"Should any goods or chattels subject to the provisions of this [conditional sales]
Act be affixed to any realty such goods and chattels shall notwithstanding remain
so subject . .. ."
The present Ontario Conditional Sales Act, REv. STAT. ONT. ch. 61, § 10(1)
(1960), provides: "Subject to [a duty to file] where the goods, other than building
material, have been affixed to realty, they remain subject to the rights of the seller
as fully as they were before being so affixed . . ." The exclusion of building
materials is discussed at pp. 1226-27 infra.
68 Pa. Laws 1923, No. 91, §2, at 118:
As against a prior mortgage or other prior incumbrancer of the realty,
who has not assented to the reservation of priority in the chattels, if any of
the chattels are so attached to the realty as not to be severable without
material injury to the freehold, the reservation of property so attached shall
be void . . . unless such injury can be completely repaired . . . and the
seller . . . tenders . . . sufficient bond conditioned for the immediate making
of such repair.
69 The Uniform Act was Pa. Laws 1925, No. 325, at 603; a modification of the
1915 and 1923 acts was Pa. Laws 1925, No. 395, at 722.
70 Pa. Laws 1925, No. 325, § 1, at 604. See Leary, supra note 62, at 518-21.
71 Pa. Laws 1927, No. 470, at 979.
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indicate that he was thinking of a rather wide category of goods which
could be removed,72 it is also possible to cite support for the proposition
that the act was intended to perpetuate the common-law limitations on
the right to remove an item which had become part of the realty.7 3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the federal courts inter-
preting Pennsylvania law held that certain goods which quite clearly
could have been removed under the 1915 act were nonremovable under
the 1927 act. In reaching this conclusion the courts had to find the
Pennsylvania common law of fixtures which the UCSA "perpetuated,"
as well as to interpret the key phrase of the 1927 act, "material injury
to the freehold." " In doing so the courts overlooked the 1915 act
and its own cases in the nearest possible area, i.e., Pennsylvania's bail-
ment leases, 75 and went back almost a century to a case having little to
do with the contest before them, Voorhis v. Freeman.7" This case,
which was the source of the industrial plant mortgage doctrine held:
"Whether fast or loose, . . . all the machinery of a manufactory
which is necessary to constitute it and without which it would not be
a manufactory at all, must pass as part of the freehold." 7' The
Voorhis rationale supplied the basis for the decision in Central
Lithograph Co. v. Eatmor Chocolate Co.,78 where the state supreme
court held that chocolate and candy-making machinery were not
severable from the freehold even though removal would not have re-
sulted in material injury to the building itself and any damage could
722A UNFORm LAWS ANoTAmD I[66, at 98-99 (1924) (Bogerts Commentaries
on Conditional Sales).
73 "[The act] is intended to perpetuate this common law doctrine that there are
limits to the powers of the seller and buyer with respect to reservation of title to
fixtures conditionally sold." Id. at 99. In any event, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
and the federal courts interpreting Pennsylvania fixture law have been sufficiently
spanked for their failure to see what the legislature may have intended. See, e.g.,
Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 HiAv. L. Rv. 1333, 1362-63 (1963);
Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 CoLum. L. REV. 44 (1964).
In defense of the courts, it must be admitted that they understood and followed the
English language when clearly used by the 1915 and 1935 draftsmen.
74 Pa. Laws 1927, No. 470, § 7, at 979.
75 See Leary, supra note 62, at 518-21.
702 W. & S. 116, 37 Am. Dec. 490 (Pa. 1841). The decision is in the best free-
flowing style of Chief Judge Gibson. It is worth noting that the court in Voorhis
indicated that the decision was not intended to settle the issue of whether goods
were chattels or realty in other contexts, such as between lessor and lessee. Titus v.
Poland Coal Co., 275 Pa. 431, 119 Atl. 540 (1923) applied Voorhis to a trespass
action. But see Wick v. Bredin, 189 Pa. 83, 42 Ati. 17 (1899) ; National Bank v.
North, 160 Pa. 303, 28 At. 694 (1894), which seem to qualify the Voorhis rule by
looking for the intention of the parties. However, the intention test was rejected in
Holland Furnace Co. v. Suzik, 118 Pa. Super. 405, 180 Atl. 38 (1935), although it
is significant that the plaintiff in this case did not file as required by the UCSA. The
court was willing to extend the Voorhis rule to a furnace in a private dwelling even
though the furnace might be separated without physical damage.
77 2 W. & S. at 119, 37 Am. Dec. at 493.
78 316 Pa. 300, 175 Atl. 697 (1934).
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have been repaired at a small cost.79 The court followed Common-
wealth Trust Co. v. Harkins I (which in turn had followed Voorhis),
in which we considered all our preceding cases . . . [and]
laid down the broad principle that all machinery in a manu-
facturing plant, necessary for its operation as a complete
going concern, is part of the freehold and bound by a lien of
a mortgage thereon, and that it matters not when the ma-
chinery is installed, whether before or after the giving of the
mortgage."1
Furthermore, the court advised conditonal vendors to do what most
fixture security acts are intended to excuse them from doing: to get
the consent of existing real estate mortgagees."s
Pennsylvania amended its own nonuniform version of the UCSA
in 1935, and did so in a manner which, from all appearances, almost
settled the fixture problem it had faced for so many years.s This
section obviously borrowed from the 1915 act, but it seems to have no
counterpart in the law of other states.
Section 7. Fixtures ...
Goods to be affixed to realty shall not become a part of
the said realty, . . . or of any operating plant of which they
may form a part, but shall be treated as severable and sub-
ject to removal as against the conditional vendee, . . . and,
also, as against any mortgagee, encumbrancer, owner, pur-
chaser or other person having any interest in or liens against
such real property . . . if, prior to the said affixing or attach-
79 The damage to the building caused by removal could have been repaired for
$125. Id. at 303, 175 Atl. at 698.
S0 312 Pa. 402, 167 Ati. 278 (1933). The contest in this case was between a
mortgagee of the realty and a receiver in bankruptcy representing creditors without
a security interest in the industrial machinery. The court rendered judgment in favor
of the mortgagee. The lack of security interest in the hands of the creditors severely
weakens the precedent value of the case in the Eatmor situation. The same weakness
exists in the Voorhis case.
81 Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmor Chocolate Co., 316 Pa. 300, 304-05, 175
Atl. 697, 699 (1934).
82 Id. at 309, 175 AtI. at 700-01. In Clayton v. Leinhard, 312 Pa. 433, 167 Atl.
321 (1933), the court held that an automatic sprinkler system which could not be
removed without material physical damage to both the freehold and to itself could be
removed by the holder of a mechanics lien despite the fact that it was realty. In Medical
Tower Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 104 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1939), the court denied
removal of an elevator subject to a conditional sales contract. Although there would
not have been material damage to the freehold, the Voorhis and Eatmor rule precluded
removal because the elevator was an integral part of the apartment building operation.
The seller apparently failed to comply with the recording provision of the act, but
the court did not consider this fact material. But see M. P. Moller, Inc. v. Mainker,
314 Pa. 314, 171 AtI. 476 (1934), where the court permitted removal of an organ
from a theater because it was not essential to the operation of the theater and the
mortgagee had knowledge of the lease agreement (the court indicated that, in absence
of actual notice, implied notice by correct filing under the 1927 Act would have pro-
duced the same result).
83 Pa. Laws 1935, No. 239, at 658.
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ing of the goods to the realty, the conditional sale contract or
copy thereof, together with a statement signed by the seller
briefly describing the realty and stating that the goods are to
be affixed thereto, shall have been filed . . . [in] the county
in which the said realty is situate: Provided, however, if an
owner or prior encumbrancer of the said realty shall demand
a bond to protect him against loss, resulting from damage
which may be caused to the land or to the physical structure
of the building or other improvements to which such goods
are attached by the removal of the said goods conditionally
sold, the conditional seller or his successor in interest shall de-
liver to the said owner or prior encumbrancer a good and
sufficient bond, conditioned for the immediate making of such
repairs, said bond to be in a sum equal to the cost of making
the said repairs, before commencing the detachment or re-
moval of the said goods . . . .
The unique 1935 Pennsylvania version of UCSA's section 7, like the
1915 act before it, contemplates only two classes of collateral, both of
which are removable-chattels, with no fixture filing, and fixtures,
subject to the requirements of that act. The 1935 act provides a
clear statement that any goods can be removed if the proper procedures
are followed. However, practically, it imposes an economic test. Re-
moval will be unprofitable if the "loss, resulting from damage which
may be caused to the land or to the physical structure of the building
or other improvements to which such goods are attached by the removal
of said goods conditionally sold . . ." will amount to more than
the value of the goods removed. The question of what goods can be
severed was thus divorced from Pennsylvania's fixture case law and
the industrial plant mortgage doctrine which originated in Voorhis v.
Freeman. Under the 1935 act it was immaterial that the goods had
become part of the real estate for some other purposes, or that an
earlier real estate mortgagee would acquire an interest prior to that of
the debtor once the conditional vendor had been paid. The danger,
encountered in a number of cases, that the affixed goods had become
nonremovable parts of the realty " would seem to have been effectively
eliminated."' If Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmor Chocolate Co.
represented the pre-existing realty law, it is difficult to avoid a con-
84 Pa. Laws 1935, No. 239, at 660.
85 Ibid.
8 6 See, e.g., Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmor Chocolate Co., 316 Pa. 300, 175
Al. 697 (1934).
87 Il words the statute is perhaps less clear in deciding whether a filing is required
in the fixture record, as distinguished from a filing in the chattel records, but the
implication is clear enough. The act applied only to goods "affixed!" or, "fast," in
Chief Judge Gibson's language and this could hardly include goods which were
"loose." 2 W. & S. 116, 119, 37 Am. Dec. 490, 493 (1841).
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clusion that the 1935 act, like the 1915 act before it, changed not only
chattel law but also real estate law.
When Pennsylvania's Code came into effect in 1954, section 9-313
read as follows:
(1) When under other rules of law goods are so affixed or
related to the realty as to be a part thereof, a security
interest in such goods which attaches before they become
part of the realty takes priority as to such goods over
the claims of all persons who have an interest in the
realty except
(a) a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in
the realty; or
(b) a subsequent judgment creditor with a lien on the
realty; or
(c) a prior encumbrancer of the realty to the extent
that he makes subsequent advances
provided that the purchaser or lien creditor becomes
such or the prior encumbrancer makes such advances
without knowledge the security interest and before its
perfection ....
(2) When under subsection (1) a secured party has a
priority over the claims of all persons who have an in-
terest in the realty he may on default subject to the pro-
visions of Part 5 remove his collateral from the realty
but he must reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the
realty who is not the debtor and who has not otherwise
agreed for the cost of repair of any physical injury but
not for any diminution of value of the realty caused by
absence of the goods or by any necessity of replacing
them. A person entitled to reimbursement may refuse
permission to remove until the secured party gives ade-
quate security for the performance of this obligation.'
Some comparisons between this earlier version of section 9-313
and the Pennsylvania fixture statute of 1935 are of more than passing
interest. Apparently, only the Code and Pennsylvania's statutes (cul-
minating in the 1935 version) substituted a requirement that the re-
mover pay damages caused by removal of a fixture for a flat denial of
the right to remove when material injury to the realty would result.
This part of section 9-313 must have been taken from the act it re-
placed in Pennsylvania. The priorities are also similar. The 1935
amendment required filing within ten days to protect even against a
holder of an earlier real estate mortgage, while section 9-313 required
88 Pa. Laws 1953, No. 1, § 9-313, at 167.
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filing only to protect against those who subsequently acquired interests
in the realty. However, since the right to remove under the former
section 9-313 (as under the present section 9-313) is dependent on the
secured party's having, at the time of removal, priority against subse-
quent as well as earlier acquired realty interests, no fixture-secured
party could count on a right to remove unless he filed. However, an
essential difference was created by the first sentence of the earlier
section 9-313 (1) : "When under other rules of law goods are so affixed
or related to the realty as to be a part thereof . . . "
Unlike the 1915 and 1935 Pennsylvania statutes, section 9-313
directs the reader to look elsewhere to determine when its rules apply,
and it reintroduces the question as to whether "loose goods related to
the realty" in a manner which does not constitute affixation are subject
to fixture filing rules. It is not surprising that Pennsylvania lawyers
had some difficulty in predicting how their highest court would inter-
pret the Code." It would seem reasonable to read section 9-313's first
sentence as though it merely incorporates the conditional sales fixture
law which was in effect until the Code was enacted-the 1935 Penn-
sylvania version of UCSA section 7. However, the "part of the
89 Pa. Laws 1953, No. 1, § 9-313(1), at 167. (Emphasis added.)
90 See Robinson, McGough & Scheinholtz, supra note 62. In lawyer-like fashion
the writers review Pennsylvania's peculiar chattel security history in their search
for some law which will answer the question to which the Code gives no answer:
What are the "other rules of law" which determine when "goods are so affixed or
related to the realty as to be a part thereof?" This discussion of "other law" includes
only passing references to the 1935 amendment to the so-called UCSA, which, for
reasons submitted below, would seem to be the logical starting point, and were it
not for the "part of the realty" language, the only logical reference.
Leary, upra note 62, also reviews the Pennsylvania history at length as well as
in some depth. While he devotes greater attention to the 1935 amendment of the
so-called UCSA, it is still a very small part of the total article. Leary suggests that
the rule might be found in Clayton v. Lienhard, 312 Pa. 433, 167 Atl. 321 (1933).
This writer finds that suggestion very difficult to follow because the Clayton case
involved a mechanic's lien, not a conditional sale. Furthermore, the word fixture is
not used in the Code sense, and is defined on a level of abstraction which makes it
difficult to apply.
Robinson, McGough & Scheinholtz, supra note 62, at 97-98, also state:
It should be noted, however, that where an industrial mortgage has been
executed prior to the effective date of the Act (July 1, 1954), the mortgagee's
rights will remain unaffected by the Act. Any abridgement of these rights
would be an impairment of the mortgagee's contractual rights based on the
law as it existed at the time of the execution of the mortgage and would,
consequently, be unconstitutional.
It should be added that if there were a constitutional point arising out of the removal
of goods added under a conditional sale contract to a plant subject to an industrial
plant mortgage in existence on the effective date of the Code, the same problem arose
under Pennsylvania's 1915 fixture-conditional sales legislation as well as under the
1935 legislation. This point is also challenged by another Pennsylvania lawyer, Leary,
supra note 62, at 529-30 n.121.
Finally it is worth noting that the constitutional argument can cut both ways.
Section 9-313 decreased the rights of the conditional vendor and correspondingly
increased rights of realty holders by making not removable under any circumstances
certain goods ("goods incorporated into a structure") which could have been removed
by one who filed under the 1935 act and performed his duty to repair.
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realty" language presents difficulties with this interpretation. The
1935 act was clear:
Goods to be affixed to realty shall not become a part of said
realty, or of the freehold to which they are attached or are to
be attached, or of any operating plant of which they may
form a part, but shall be treated as severable and subject to
removal . . . if . . . [a proper filing is made].1
In spirit and objective section 9-313 seems to be a child of Penn-
sylvania's 1935 fixture legislation, but the words of the two statutes
simply do not mesh. However, they must be made compatible in order
to make any sense at all out of the Code. If section 9-313 incorporates
some Pennsylvania fixture law other than that of the 1935 act, it must
go outside conditional sales fixture law to law involving landlord and
tenant, or real estate grantor and grantee. This presents an alarming
possibility to lawyers, who can rightfully cite the case of First National
Bank v. Reichneder 9 2 as an example of Pennsylvania courts tendency
to favor real estate interests. The case held that beer kegs had been
caught by a real estate mortgage which described the realty only by
metes and bounds, and not only did not mention beer kegs but did not
mention a brewery. The actual holding of the case can be explained
in terms of the chattel mortgage statute then in effect, and the case
should have no bearing on the interpretation of section 9-313; but it
does indicate the court's inclination to return to the industrial plant
mortgage doctrine in cases where the statute is unclearY Therefore
it stands as an ominous symbol to the conditional vendor.
Where the state had by a series of trials and errors finally sep-
arated out its conditional sales law of fixtures from the law determining
when goods otherwise become part of the realty or of an operating
plant, it seems unreasonable to assume that its legislature abandoned
the fruits of that experience without being more explicit." If one
spends enough time on the Pennsylvania cases and the Code, he can
come up with a pretty firm conclusion that section 9-313 was not
intended to revoke the progress that culminated in the 1935 amendment
to the Pennsylvania version of the UCSA, but it should be less
9 1 Pa. Laws 1935, No. 239, at 658. (Emphasis added.)
92371 Pa. 463, 91 A2d 277 (1952).
93 The industrial plant mortgage doctrine was pointedly rejected by the legis-
lature so far as conditional sales are concerned when it passed the 1915 act and again
when it enacted the 1935 amendment.
94 The rule as to the rare post-affixation security interest in fixtures, § 9-313(3),
is not necessarily different from that which would prevail under the industrial plant
mortgage doctrine.
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difficult for both lawyers and courts to determine what section 9-313
means.
95
The previous discussion has been confined to the text of section
9-313 as it was originally adopted in Pennsylvania in 1954. In 1959
Pennsylvania followed the national sponsors' suggestions and revised
section 9-313.96 The amended text left open all of the questions which
had previously perplexed careful lawyers in Pennsylvania, and it may
have added to them; but that is getting ahead of our story, since
the amended form was adopted first by Massachusetts.
B. The Experience in Massachusetts
If the Pennsylvania legislature took the Code on faith, and the
Pennsylvania bar was apologetic in criticizing its language, their ex-
ample was not followed in Massachusetts, the second state to adopt
the Code. In Massachusetts the Code was adopted only after a long
fight in the legislature. After enactment, its local sponsors, including
this writer, were pressed by respected members of the real estate bar
for an explanation of the Code's fixture provisions. What kind of
collateral added to the real estate is removable without the consent of
a prior real estate mortgagee, and what can be removed only with his
consent? What are these "fixtures" the Code speaks of? Where
does one file for what collateral? 7  The Code that was adopted in
Massachusetts included the revised version of section 9-313."' It will
15 It has been argued that while § 9-313(5) changes the industrial plant doctrine
in making fixtures removable against an earlier real estate mortgagee, it serves to
require a filing in the fixture records for anything which under that doctrine could
be held a part of the realty. But if the removal rules of § 9-313(5) take away the
meat of the coconut, is there any sense in having a fixture filing in order to preserve
the shell? If the Code's § 9-313 is to be uniform in application, an out of state
conditional vendor should not be expected to know that a filing for beer kegs (or
other "loose" collateral) should be made in the fixture records.
10 The change was made in the 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS oF THE EDITORIAL BoARD
FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 290-91 (1957). In the 1954-1956 studies of the
New York Law Revision Commission, the phrase "part of the realty" was mildly criti-
cized as being indefinite. See NEW YORK LAW REvISION COmmissioN REPORT 48, 478
(1956). On the assumption that the term "fixture" had a more fixed meaning than
"part of the realty," with little significance being attached to their change, the Article
Nine Subcommittee adopted the term "fixture." They also rewrote the section almost
in its entirety. The 1956 recommendations state only that it was changed "for clarity."
97 Fixture filings were better integrated into the realty records by a new section,
9-409, added by Mass. Acts & Resolves 1960, ch. 379, at 275-76.
98 Priority of Security Interest in Fixtures
(1) The rules of the section do not apply to goods incorporated into a
structure in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work and
the like and no security interest in them exists under this Article unless the
structure remains personal property under applicable law. The law of this
state other than this Act determines whether and when other goods become
fixtures. This Act does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures
or real estate pursuant to the law applicable to real estate.
(2) A security interest which attaches to goods before they become
fixtures takes priority as to the goods over the claims of all persons who have
an interest in the real estate except as stated in subsection (4).
(3) A security interest which attaches to goods after they become fix-
tures is valid against all persons subsequently acquiring interests in the real
UNIFORMITY IN FIXTURES
be noted that, unlike the earlier version, this new section uses the
term "fixtures." The use of this word gave the bar adequate cause for
concern. Massachusetts had not adopted the UCSA and its single
statute dealing with fixture-like items disavowed the test of whether
an item in the named classes of goods was or was not a fixture at
common law. The term "fixture" had not often been used by Massa-
chusetts courts in the Code sense." If the court's conclusion was that
the goods were removable, they were called personalty; if nonremov-
able, they were called real estate. When the term "fixture" was used, it
was likely to be used in the Ohio sense of an item which had become a
nonremovable part of the realty.
For almost a century prior to adoption of the Code, Massachu-
setts courts adhered to the doctrine of Clary v. Owen,' which held
that once goods became a part of the realty, an existing real estate
mortgagee acquired rights in them superior to the rights of one who had
a security interest in the goods. However, in practice, the case could not
be relied upon, because the supreme judicial court upheld findings
estate except as stated in subsection (4) but is invalid against any person
with an interest in the real estate at the time the security interest attaches
to the goods who has not in writing consented to the security interest or dis-
claimed an interest in the goods as fixtures.
(4) The security interests described in subsections (2) and (3) do not
take priority over
(a) a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the real
estate; or
(b) a creditor with a lien on the real estate subsequently ob-
tained by judicial proceedings; or
(c) a creditor with a prior encumbrance of record on the real
estate to the extent that he makes subsequent advances
if the subsequent purchase is made, the lien by judicial proceedings is obtained,
or the subsequent advance under the prior encumbrance is made or con-
tracted for without knowledge of the security interest and before it is per-
fected. A purchaser of the real estate at a foreclosure sale other than an
encumbrancer purchasing at his own forclosure sale is a subsequent purchaser
within this section.
(5) When under subsections (2) or (3) and (4) a secured party has
priority over the claims of all persons who have interests in the real estate,
he may, on default, subject to the provisions of Part 5, remove his collateral
from the real estate but he must reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of
the real estate who is not the debtor and who has not otherwise agreed for the
cost of repair of any physical injury, but not for any diminution in value of
the real estate caused by the absence of the goods removed or by any necessity
for replacing them. A person entitled to reimbursement may refuse permis-
sion to remove until the secured party gives adequate security for the per-
formance of this obligation.
UNmFORm ComERcrA. CODE § 9-313.
99 See MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 184, § 13 (Supp. 1964), discussed at text accom-
panying note 103 infra. The term "fixture" does not appear in General Heat &
Appliance Co. v. Goodwin, 316 Mass. 3, 54 N.E.2d 676 (1942), a leading case on
the question of whether a furnace is removable.
100 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 522 (1860). Compare Hopewell Mills v. Taunton Say.
Bank, 150 Mass. 519, 23 N.E. 327 (1890) (often looked upon as the leading case
favoring real estate interests), zith Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637 (1914), and Camp-
bell v. Roddy, 44 N.J. Eq. 244, 14 Atl. 279 (Ct. Err. & App. 1888).
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of fact that in a particular instance goods remained personal property
and hence were freely removable, even though they were attached in
such a way that some states would have called them fixtures." 1 The
tendency in fixture law to avoid too harsh a result by characterizing the
goods as personalty in the guise of a fact finding is not confined to
Massachusetts and illustrates the error of drafting a statute from a class
standpoint, whether the class be real estate mortgagees'0 2 or condi-
tional vendors.
In 1912 the Massachusetts legislature adopted its first and only
statute (subsequently amended from time to time) relating to condi-
tional sales of fixtures. The original statute reads as follows:
No conditional sale of heating apparatus, plumbing goods,
ranges or other personal property which are afterward
wrought into or attached to real estate shall be valid as
against any mortgagee, purchaser or grantee of such real
estate, unless within ten days after the making of the contract
of conditional sale, such contract, or a memorandum thereof
signed by both parties thereto, is recorded in the clerk's office
of the city or town in which the real estate is situated. 3
The 1912 statute is of great interest and reflects the unpredictabil-
ity so characteristic of the fixture field, even in a state which appeared
to follow a definite doctrine." 4 It is not unnatural to read the 1912
Massachusetts statute as though its purpose was the same as that of
the 1915 Pennsylvania statute discussed previously 15 or the later
UCSA 'o6-to provide a mechanism by which (x) a conditional vendor
could retain as against holders of all interests in the realty his right to
remove fixtures added by him and (y) to warn a future purchaser of
an interest in the realty of the existence of the conditional vendor's
interest.
101 See Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 HAIv. L. REV. 1333, 1355
(1963) ; cf. 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 19.12, at 51 nn.16 & 17 (Casner ed. 1952).
"The precedents are thus very confusing. . . [as they] cannot be rationalized on
any basis other than that they were jury verdicts."
102 See text accompanying note 129 infra for Ohio's change in Code fixture
priorities.
Professor Niles said of the Massachusetts doctrine: "The chief objection to the
minority view is that it works so harshly in certain cases that a jury may avoid its
rigor by solemnly declaring that heavy and firmly affixed objects are not fixtures at
all." 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 19.12, at 50-51 (Casner ed. 1952).
0o 3Mass. Acts & Resolves 1912, ch. 271.
104 The legislature from time to time added to the list of goods covered by the
statute, but it also showed its awareness of the vagaries of fixture law by adding
in 1918, at the end of the list of covered items the words "whether they are fixtures
at common law or not." Mass. Acts & Resolves 1918, ch. 257, § 382.
105 See pp. 1198-99 .spra.
206 See text of UCSA § 7 in its "uniform" version, note 154 infra.
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At an early date the court decided that "or other personal prop-
erty" following the list of specific goods covered by the statute re-
ferred only to goods ejusdem generis, and not to all fixtures.l"' Nor
was statutory filing necessary as to all goods of the enumerated classes
to protect the conditional vendor against future purchasers of the
realty. Furnaces, for example, are heating equipment, but a furnace
may not have lost its character as ordinary personal property. It may
not have been "wrought in" or have become part of the realty, which
was a question to be determined under "other law"-which meant that
it was primarily a matter for the finder of the facts."" Finally, almost
two decades after its adoption, the court decided that the statute did
not alter the doctrine of Clary v. Owen 109 so far as prior real estate
mortgagees were concerned and that filing thus gave protection only
against subsequent mortgagees and purchasers."1
When the limited scope of the statute, as judicially interpreted, was
combined with the fact-finding of what goods are subject to its pro-
visions, the statute served little practical purpose and instead resulted
in substantial uncertainty. The subsequent purchaser of real estate
ran the risk that what he thought had become an irremovable part of
the real estate had remained personal property, and hence was remov-
able even though the real estate record did not provide him with
notice."1 The problems of relying upon fact-finding reached a high
pointed in two cases decided in the same year, involving the same type
of collateral (refrigeration systems), sold by the same conditional
vendor in the same city, and affixed in the same manner to two apart-
ment houses in adjoining neighborhoods. In neither case did the con-
ditional vendor file. In one case the supreme court upheld a finding
that the system had not become part of the realty and could be re-
moved; 11 in the other, the same high court upheld the opposite find-
ing."' The court said:
The bald physical facts . . . [in the two cases] do not differ
in essential particulars . . . The difference between . . .
[the two] cases . . . consists in diverse inferences drawn
107 Crown Shade & Screen Co. v. Karlburg, 332 Mass. 229, 124 N.E.2d 238
(1955) ; Babcock Davis Corp. v. Paine, 240 Mass. 438, 134 N.E. 342 (1922).
108 See Gardner v. Buckley & Scott, Inc., 280 Mass. 106, 181 N.E. 802 (1932).
The court held that while oil burners are "heating and plumbing equipment!' for
which the statute required a filing, no filing was necessary if the goods remained
personalty.
109 See text accompanying note 100 supra.
11" Waverly Co-operative Bank v. Haney, 273 Mass. 477, 173 N.E. 699 (1930).
"11 Gardner v. Buckley & Scott, Inc., 280 Mass. 106, 181 N.E. 802 (1932).
112 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Gould, 275 Mass. 48, 175 N.E. 264 (1931).
113 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Commonwealth Mortgage & Loan Co., 276 Mass.
335, 177 N.E. 88 (1931).
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by the trial judges in those cases as to the intent of the
parties in installing the refrigerating system . ... What-
ever inconsistencies may appear . . . [rest] wholly upon
different findings of essential facts and not resting in any
degree upon different rules of law . . . . The governing
principles of law are the same; the conclusion as to the facts
may vary. . .. 114
Real estate mortgagees could rightly object to the number of cases in
which, with no filing or recording, conditional vendors convinced a
judge or jury that furnaces, oil burners, and built-in refrigeration
systems had never become part of the realty and hence were removable
without a fixture filing." 5
However, the pendulum began to swing and in a later case "I the
court itself suggested that the primary purpose of the Massachusetts
fixture statute was not to protect the conditional vendor who had filed,
but to protect the earlier real estate mortgagee against cases like Henry
N. Clarke Co. v. Skelton," 7 which held that a furnace was properly
found to have remained personal property. While it can be said that
the later cases were more likely to favor the real estate interests, the
basis upon which they were decided hardly encouraged predictability.
In General Heat & Appliance Co. v. Goodwin, " the court dis-
tinguished a line of cases holding that fixture-like items had remained
personalty on the basis that the action had been at law, while General
Heat was in equity. Needless to say, lawyers who must make a
prediction before the completion of a secured transaction are not pleased
by such distinctions.
14 Id. at 340-41, 177 N.E. at 90-91.
115 The result of this state of the law is to make impossible any uniformity
of decision or predictability of result in this wide field of constantly recurring
identical factual situations. Each case depends on the reaction of the par-
ticular judge or jury and as a result this class of cases involving property
rights is as uncertain and speculative as cases of tort.
LANDLORD'S FixTuREs, 17 MAss. L.Q. (1932) (final part, p. 5).
116 Gar Wood Indus., Inc. v. Colonial Homes, Inc., 305 Mass. 41, 24 N.E.2d 767
(1940).
1 7208 Mass. 284, 94 N.E. 399 (1911).
118316 Mass. 3, 54 N.E.2d 676 (1944). Apart from MAss. ANx. LAWS, ch.
184, § 13 (Supp. 1964), Massachusetts courts had no occasion to decide what is a
fixture as between conditional vendors and holders of interests in the realty to which
conditionally sold goods were affixed. If goods retained their character as personalty
they were removable without any filing, even if the goods were part of the class
covered by the statute. Apart from this statute, goods became absorbed into the real
estate whether, to use the Code's terms, they became fixtures or became incorporated
into a structure. Only if goods were of the enumerated classes and had become
realty was filing required, and then it protected only against subsequent purchasers
(including mortgagees). This case and more particularly the case of Menard v.
Courchaine, 278 Mass. 7, 179 N.E. 167 (1931), reminds us that the reasoning upon
which the New Jersey "institutional doctrine" is based is not by any means confined
to the UCSA cases in that state.
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The previous discussion suggests that this is not the type of
question which should be left for decision after the fact to courts, and
particularly not to juries. No doubt, the parties could operate under
any one of a number of different sets of rules if only the rule were
reasonably ascertainable at the time the transaction was entered into.
Reliance upon a vague law of "fixtures," at least in a state like Massa-
chusetts, provides no adequate basis for a new uniform statute. The
one pre-Code statute which governed conditional sales of goods attached
to the realty was of course repealed; its disavowal of the common-law
fixture test is of no help.
In Pennsylvania a critic of the Code could fairly state that the
Code's section 9-313 had muddied up waters which, after a century of
unusual stirring, had fairly well settled in 1935. It is clear that
Massachusetts had no settled fixture law for the Code to disturb; there
the sin was one of omission-failure to correct a long-standing defect.
The same is true, it is submitted, of the next state we look at-Ohio.
C. The Ohio Answer and Commentators Thereon
A century ago Ohio provided fixture law with the famous case
of Teaff v. Hewitt,"9 which attempted to define, once and for all and
for all purposes, what is and what is not a fixture. The court used
fixture in a way which differs from its Code use:
A fixture is an article which was a chattel, but which by
being physically annexed or affixed to the realty, became
accessory to it and part and parcel of it. 2 '
A removable fixture as a term of general application, is a
solecism-a contradiction in words.12 1
The court saw no necessity for use of any term (as the Code uses the
term "fixture") to describe a part of the realty which is removable
only under certain circumstances.
There does not appear to be any necessity or propriety in
classifying moveable articles, which may be for temporary
purposes somewhat attached to the land, under any general
denomination distinguishing them from other chattel prop-
erty .... 122
119 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853). One reading judge Bartley's language would assume
that the court would find all the property in question to be realty; but that is not
the holding. This led to a remark by a leading authority on fixtures: "The manner
in which the test was stated and applied was so unsatisfactory, . . . that little uni-
formity of decision has resulted from its use." 5 AMERICAN LAw op PROPERTY § 19.3,
at 19 (Casner ed. 1952).
M Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 527 (1853).
1211d. at 524.
122 Id. at 524-25.
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One can sympathize, as does this author, with the problem faced
by an Ohio counsel in working with section 9-313 before the act was
amended at the instigation of the Ohio real estate bar (particularly the
savings and loan interests). In an article begun before and finished
after the 1963 amendment was enacted, Mr. Sherman Hollander
pointed up the problem from the viewpoint of a title company counsel:
The leading case of Teaff v. Hewitt has been simultaneously
incorporated into the Code and overruled by it. For over
a century, Ohio has recognized two basic types of tangible
property-real and personal. When a unit of personal
property becomes a fixture, Ohio law has considered it real
property.m
It is clear from subsection (5) that section 9-313 refers to the
kind of a fixture which is removable by a fixture secured party with
the proper priority. Since Ohio had no case law as well as no statutes
which allowed removal by a conditional vendor who had followed a
prescribed mechanism applicable to goods affixed in a certain way,
the courts of Ohio (and at a much earlier time, its lawyers) will have
to look elsewhere for a classification of the kind of fixture to which the
Code refers. Where will they look? Probably not to Massachusetts.
2 4
To New York, with its "inherent chattels" doctrine? 125 To Penn-
sylvania, with its industrial plant mortgage doctrine? 126 If to Penn-
sylvania, to which period of its history? 1
27
One can appreciate Mr. Hollander's problem concerning what a
Code fixture is in Ohio, but as to his worry about the earlier real
estate mortgagee who thought that a new furnace would fall completely
under his earlier mortgage, we can be less sympathetic. The essential
difficulty with Hollander's position is that he assumes that the earlier
real estate mortgagee should get an interest in a fixture superior to the
interest which has attached to the goods before they became affixed to
the land. This view disregards the difference between the interest
obtained by an earlier real estate mortgage in goods fully incorporated
=2 Hollander, Imperfections in Perfection of Ohio Fixture Liens, 14 W. RES. L.
REv. 683, 686 (1963). See also Shanker, An Integrated Financing System for Pur-
chase Money Collateral: A Proposed Solution to the Fixture Problem Under Section
9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 YALE L.J. 788 (1964) ; Zangerle, What
Are Fixtures in Ohio?-A Criticimn of the Supreme Court Opinions in the Standard
Oil Cases, 33 OHio Op. 142 (1946) ; Fixtures-Purchaser at Judicial Sale-Rights
of Conditional Vendor of Chattel and Prior Mortgagee of Realty, 14 OHio Op. 164
(1939) (discussion of the Holland Furnace case); Comment, 6 OHIO ST. L.J. 219
(1940) (discussion of Holland Furnace and XXth Century Furnace cases).
2A4 See pp. 1206-11 supra.
125 See pp. 1219-20 infra.
12G The Teaff court rejected the Voorhis doctrine, discussed at pp. 1200-01 supra,
1 Ouio ST. 511, 529 (1853).
127 See pp. 1197-1206 supra.
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into the structure (such as bricks in a chimney), and the goods the
Code calls fixtures. Section 9-313(2) applied the purchase money
concept only to the latter class of goods. The essential concept of a
purchase money security interest (whether in fixtures or any other
collateral) is that it survives even when the goods have become a part
of a larger body of collateral.' As to fixtures the real estate mortgagee
can claim only whatever interest the debtor has at the time of affixation
or any interest that the debtor subsequently acquires. However, the
view urged by Mr. Hollander prevailed .so far as prior interests in
the realty are concerned, and Ohio reversed the basic priority rule of
section 9-313(2). Effective October 8, 1963, Ohio changed its
counterpart of subsection (2) of section 9-313 to read:
A fixture [including a pre-affixation] security interest is in-
valid against any person with an interest in the real estate
at the time the security interest in the goods is perfected or
at the time the goods are affixed to the real estate, whichever
occurs later, who has not in writing consented to the security
interest or disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures
129
Its proponents claim that this change restored the law as estab-
lished by Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Say. & Loan Co.,'30 but
this is disputed by another Ohio authority 31 who contends that it goes
further than the opinion in that case, which dealt with the rights of a
subsequent purchaser of the real estate (who happened also to be a
prior mortgagee). In any event, it is now clear that in Ohio if the
item has become a fixture, the debtor can purchase it under a condi-
tional sales agreement only if he gets the prior approval of his real
estate mortgagee. 2
A saving grace is that Ohio, consistent with its adhesion to Teaff
v. Hewitt, treats "detachable machinery" as chattels." * This tendency
takes much of the sting out of the Ohio legislation. The class of goods
which remain personalty (in which therefore it is possible to get a
security interest ahead of the prior real estate mortgagee even without
=8 See Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637 (1914).
129 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1309.32(B) (Page Supp. 1964).
130 135 Ohio St. 48, 19 N.E.2d 273 (1939).
131 Shanker, An Integrated Financing System for Purchase Money Collateral:
A Proposed Soltion to the Fixture Problem Under Section 9-313 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 73 YALE LJ. 788, 789 (1964).
132 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1309.32(B) (Page Supp. 1964).
133 "It cannot be argued that such a lien is needed to permit plant expansion, since
detachable machinery is likely to be personalty in Ohio." Hollander, supra note 123,
at 687. The author cites Zangerle v. Republic Steel Corp., 144 Ohio St. 529, 60
N.E.2d 170 (1945), among other cases. However, the decision of the court in the
Zangerle case is questioned by Zangerle, supra note 123.
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a fixture filing) fortunately is larger than it is in some states. It could
well be that the classes of goods "likely to be personalty in Ohio" 13'
may be further expanded to get around the harsh results of the new
fixture section.'35 While this tempers the conditional vendor's sorrow,
it may add to the sorrows of future real estate purchasers (including
mortgagees who make future advances) because they will get no notice
of the existence of security interests in some goods so affixed as to be
considered fixtures (and therefore subject to fixture filing require-
ments) in some other states. As in Massachusetts, the fact finder in
a judicial proceeding may simply determine that the goods in question
never ceased to be chattels. 3 6 Such a holding would penalize a subse-
quent purchaser of the realty who thought he was getting the item in
question free and clear because there was no filing which gave him
notice to the contrary; it would penalize both the earlier and the subse-
quent realty interest because the conditional vendor would be under
no duty to repair the damage caused by removal even though the act
that appears to cover the matter imposes such a duty.
The desirability of the Ohio amendment has been discussed by Mr.
Thomas A. Pfeiler, Assistant Counsel, United States Savings and
Loan League, who presented for adoption in other states a draft based
on the Ohio result.' While Ohio may live with the 1963 amendment,
either that amendment or the Pfeiler suggestion would be a serious
detriment to financing new equipment in many other states. Under
subsection (2) of Mr. Pfeiler's proposed section 9-313, a pre-affixation
security interest in fixtures would take priority over pre-existing in-
terests of the real estate only if and to the extent that the holders
thereof agree to that priority.
The chief mischief of the Ohio amendment and the Pfeiler pro-
posal is of course that they subordinate a fixture security interest which
has attached prior to affixation (which in practical terms means a
purchase money interest) to an already existing interest in the realty.
For centuries the principal purpose of fixture law has been to prescribe
3 4 Hollander, supra note 123, at 687.
135 Compare Niles, The Intention Test in the Law of Fixtures, 12 N.Y.U.L.Q.
66, 92 n.158 (1934) as to the results in practice of the comparable doctrine, which
theoretically protected real estate mortgagees in Massachusetts.
136 Ibid. Cf. 5 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.12, at 50-52 (Casner ed. 1952).
137 Pfeiler, Uniform Commercial Code-Adverse Effect on Real Estate Mortgages,
29 LEGAL BuLLETIx U.S. SAVINGS & LOAN LEAGUE 201, 207 (1963). See generally,
Blackburn, Mortgages to Secure Future Advanwes, 21 Mo. L. REV. 209 (1956). It
is easy to overestimate the amount of protection given to a financer who makes ad-
vances relying upon the effect of a future advance clause in the mortgage in a state
which has a future advance statute. The financer will be disappointed if he has entered
into this transaction without checking the statute to see what has happened between
the time his mortgage, with its future advance clause, was given and the time the
future advance is actually made.
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the rules under which goods which become part of the realty for some
purposes may be detached by some person who had an interest in
them apart from an interest in the land. Any part of the realty can
be severed with consent of all holders of realty interests; fixture secu-
rity law prescribes the circumstances under which fixtures can be re-
moved by an unpaid conditional vendor notwithstanding objections
from persons with interests in the realty. Therefore, one can almost
say that with regard to the prior realty interest, Ohio at present has
no fixture law at all.
D. California's Action and Its Reasons
As we have seen, California joined Ohio in refusing to accept the
sponsors' version of section 9-313,' but unlike Ohio, it left priority
problems to be governed by existing realty law with no help or
hindrance from section 9-313. Studies of the Code by various groups
in California all arrived at the same recommendation as to fixtures:
Do not adopt section 9-313. The California Bankers Association
concluded:
The law of fixtures is in a confused state in California.
To superimpose additional rules on the existing law would
only add to the confusion. . . . [A]n exhaustive inde-
pendent study should be made of the whole subject of fixtures
before adopting any additional legislation. 139
The state bar committee agreed. 4
When Professors Warren and Marsh were asked by the senate
committee to analyze the various proposals for amendments to the
Code, they too agreed with the recommendations above and spelled
out the reasons more fully:
The scheme of this Section of the Code is that the law
of the State outside of the Code determines whether an
object is a "fixture" and this Section of the Code then sup-
plies the legal conclusion flowing from this classification.
Any such bifurcation of the existing law of fixtures is im-
possible, since what the Code treats as two separate processes
of judgment are all one under existing law. In other words,
what the Code asks the judge to do is to decide in the ab-
stract under "existing law" whether an object is a "fixture",
and the Code will then tell him whether, for example, a
subsequent mortgagee of the land will prevail over the owner
138 See p. 1186 supra.
139 SENATE FAcr FINDING COMMTTEE ON JUDICIARY, SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO
THE LEGISLATURE 417-18 (1961) [hereinafter cited as SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT].
140 SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT 400.
1965]
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of an interest in the object apart from the land. But under
the only existing law that there is, an answer to the first
question answers the second also; and the answer might
very well be different if the legal problem presented was
different.
It would probably be a great advance in the law if the
law of fixtures could be codified and separated into two dis-
tinct problems: A factual classification of an object as a
"fixture", which is recognized as something different both
from "realty" and "personalty"; and, secondly, a statement
of the legal results in various circumstances which follow
from such a classification. It is impossible, however, to do
only half of this job without making a greater mess than
there was before. We agree with the criticism that this
Section would only "add to the confusion" of the California
law of fixtures (which is not unique in that regard). 14
It is difficult to find fault with the above analysis by Professors
Marsh and Warren. However, Professor Shanker 4 2  and Mr.
Kripke 43 have argued that every state has some law as to when goods
become part of the realty even though it may not deal with the power
of removal, which would then be conferred under section 9-313(5).
The difficulty with this argument is that it merely substitutes one vague
term for another. For Cbde purposes it is necessary to divide goods
which become part of the realty into those which are never removable
under chattel security law, "goods incorporated . . . ," and what the
Code calls fixtures. An additional difficulty is that some courts use
fixture, as do Ohio and apparently California, to mean something
which is no longer removable except with the consent of all realty
interests existing at the time of removal. The courts have employed
the word "fixture" or the phrase "part of the realty" in order to
settle a particular controversy and hence, as the California professors
point out, the answer will vary with the nature of the question. The
Supreme Court of Ohio, for example, intimated that its decision in
Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Say. & Loan Co.144 might have
been different had there been a means by which the furnace company
could have filed its conditional sale contract in the real estate records. 14
5
Therefore, once the Code with its notice provisions is in effect, the
14 1 SiXTH PROGRESS REPoRT 578.
142 Shanker, An Integrated Financing System for Purchase Money Collateral:
A Proposed Solution to the Fixture Problem Under Section 9-313 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 73 YALE L.J. 788, 794 n.31 (1964).
143 Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 CoLum. L. REV.
44, 64 (1964).
144 135 Ohio St. 43, 19 N.E.2d 273 (1939).
45Id. at 55-56, 19 N.E.2d at 276.
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reasons for considering an item of goods nonremovable at common law
may no longer exist, and the common-law fixture classification will
make little sense.
Prior to considering the Code, California had not adopted the
UCSA; nor did it have any fixture statute of its own. However,
California courts had developed two sets of rules relating to fixtures. 148
In 1920 the California Supreme Court, in Oakland Bank of Say.
v. California Pressed Brick Co., 4 decided that a conditional sale of a
fixture was invalid against a subsequent purchaser of the realty unless
filed in the real estate records. The reasoning was that while a condi-
tional sale of chattels need not be recorded in California (except in
the unusual case where a special statute so required) this exemption
ceased to apply when the chattel became part of the realty, and at that
moment the realty filing requirements became applicable. However,
even the conditional vendor of a fixture who complied with this rule
might get no protection. In Dauch v. Ginsburg "" a construction
mortgagee was held to have rights to plumbing fixtures which were
superior to the rights of a conditional vendor despite the fact that the
goods could have been removed without material damage to the
realty. Even though the Dauch case involved a construction mort-
gagee, it seems to be accepted as standing for the broad proposition
that the test of the vendor's right to remove the fixture is whether the
security of the prior mortgagee will be injured by its removal. 49 This
case, and a number which followed it (applying this standard to
radiators 150 and elevators 151), appear to rest on a principle which is
quite similar to the New Jersey "institutional doctrine." 152 If the
court finds that the functioning of the building would be impaired by
removal of the fixture, then it follows inexorably that the security of
the prior mortgagee will be injured. It is readily apparent that, since
the ability of a conditional vendor to remove was based on lack of
damage to the prior real estate mortgagee's security position, section
9-313(5)'s permission to remove notwithstanding damage to the
realty or economic loss to the earlier mortgagee would have resulted
146 Practically all important California fixture cases are discussed in Horowitz,
The Law of Fixtures i; Californa-A Critical Analysis, 26 So. CA. L. Rv. 21
(1952).
147183 Cal. 295, 191 Pac. 524 (1920).
148214 Cal. 540, 6 P.2d 952 (1931).
149 See Horowitz, supra note 146, at 52 n.66.
150 Hammel Radiator Corp. v. Mortgage Guarantee Co., 129 Cal. App. 468, 18
P.2d 993 (Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
151 Broadway Improvement & Inv. Co. v. Tumansky, 2 Cal. 2d 465, 41 P.2d 553
(1935).
152 See p. 1219 infra.
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in a material change in California fixture law-and that includes real
estate law as well as chattel security law.
Practice under the non-Code fixture law of California and under
the Ohio version of section 9-313 will be basically the same. Nothing
less than a waiver by the earlier real estate holder will protect the
conditional vendor's right to remove, and in either state filing in the
real estate records will protect only against subsequent realty interests.
My own quick review of California cases indicates that, as in Ohio,
the range of items which are held nonremovable is not very broad."5 8
E. Two Other States-New Jersey and New York
The criticism might fairly be made that the fixture laws we have ex-
amined so far represent the law only in states which follow some "mi-
nority" view as to fixtures. We might, then, look to two states which
could be said to represent the "majority" view, if such a characteriza-
tion can fairly be made. Of the states analyzed in this article, only New
Jersey and New York adopted UCSA's section 7 in anything like its
original form, 54 but, as we shall see, there was not even uniformity be-
tween these two states. New Jersey's aberrations were the result of
a court decision which resurrected a scrap of pre-UCSA law, while
New York's were the result of legislative adaptation in addition to
court decisions. Nevertheless if there is such a thing as a "majority"
view in fixture security law, we may look for it in these two states.
New Jersey was among the leading states in rejecting the Massa-
chusetts view expressed in Clary v. Owen. 5"  In the leading case of
'53 Naturally there will be differences as to what items the courts of each state
will consider as having retained their character as personal property.
154 Section 7 of the official Uniform Conditional Sales Act reads as follows:
If the goods are so affixed to realty, at the time of a conditional sale or
subsequently as to become a part thereof and not to be severable wholly
or in any portion without material injury to the freehold, the reservation
of property as to any portion not so severable shall be void after the goods
are so affixed, as against any person who has not expressly assented to the
reservation. If the goods are so affixed to realty at the time of a conditional
sale or subsequently as to become part thereof but to be severable without
material injury to the freehold, the reservation of property shall be void
after the goods are so affixed as against subsequent purchasers of the realty
for value and without notice of the conditional seller's title, unless the con-
ditional sale contract, or a copy thereof, together with a statement signed
by the seller briefly describing the realty and stating that the goods are or
are to be affxed thereto, shall be filed before such purchase in the office where
a deed of the realty would be recorded or registered to affect such realty.
As against the owner of realty the reservation of the property in goods by
a conditional seller shall be void when such goods are to be so affixed to the
realty as to become part thereof but to be severable without material injury
to the freehold, unless the conditional sale contract, or a copy thereof, together
with a statement signed by the seller briefly describing the realty and stating
that the goods are to be affixed thereto, shall be filed before they are affixed,
in the office where a deed would be recorded or registered to affect such realty.
155 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 522 (1860) ; see p. 1207 supra.
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Campbell v. Roddy,' the court held that the conditional vendor's
interest in goods added by him is superior to the interest of one who
had a real estate mortgage on the property to which these goods
became affixed. The case went on, however, to say that one reason
for holding that the conditional vendor's rights were superior was that
the security of the earlier real estate mortgagee would not be impaired
by the removal of the fixture.'57 This reasoning came into full bloom
in the "institutional doctrine" cases of the 1930's," in which cases
New Jersey courts held that oil burners and built-in refrigeration
units became nonremovable parts of the realty, without regard to fix-
ture filing, where removal would injure the "institution" which they
served-typically an apartment house. If the "institution" were in-
jured there would also be an injury to the realty mortgagee's security.
These cases under section 7 of the UCSA however cannot be reconciled
with New York decisions under what was basically the same statute.
Subsection (5) of section 9-313 seems clearly to reject the "institutional
doctrine" by allowing the fixture secured party with a proper priority to
remove upon payment of physical damages, notwithstanding economic
loss to the remaining realty.'59 However, subsection (1) of section
9-313 seems to say that one looks to the earlier fixture law of New
Jersey to determine when the rules of subsection (5) apply. It seems
obvious that there will be considerable confusion until this incon-
sistency is resolved.'
The law of New York perhaps goes as far as any in allowing the
unpaid conditional vendor to remove his collateral over objections by
the real estate interests. New York courts accepted neither the in-
35644 N.J. Eq. 244, 14 Atl. 279 (Ct Err. & App. 1888).
157Id. at 251, 14 Atl. at 283.
158The New Jersey cases held that certain fixture-like items fell within the
language of the first sentence of the UCSA § 7. See, e.g., Russ Distrib. Corp. v. Licht-
man, 111 N.J.L. 21, 166 AtI. 513 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933); Domestic Elec. Co. v.
Mezzaluna, 109 N.J.L. 574, 162 Atl. 722 (Ct Err. & App. 1932). Once this was
decided, the question of whether a fixture filing was made was immaterial since no
UCSA security interest survived in such goods. Compare the exclusion of incorpo-
rated goods in Code § 9-313(1). For perhaps the best discussion of the New Jersey
cases, see the study by Professor Farnham, The Conditional Sale of Fixtures in New
York, in NEW YoRK LAW REvisiox ComMIssiON REPORT 679 (1942).
15) It is not without interest that one would have to search a long time to find
the kind of domestic refrigeration found so essential to apartment house living in
Russ Distrib. Corp. v. Lichtman, supra note 158. It apparently was of the same
type as the system over which two Massachusetts fact-finders disagreed in the Com-
inercial Credit cases discussed at pp. 1209-10 supra.
160 These two provisions have produced some interesting comments in the New
Jersey Study Comment annotations to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A :9-313 (1962). The
annotator states that the institutional doctrine cases are still material in determining
what is affixed, though .§9-313(5) removes the restriction on the secured party's
right to remove. In this watered-down form the doctrine is harmless, but also
meaningless. New Jersey cases seemmgly never went beyond goods somehow affixed;
they did not include beer kegs or loose tools necessary for the operation conducted
in the institution.
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dustrial plant mortgage approach of Pennsylvania nor the institutional
doctrine of New Jersey.'-' Instead, the courts went so far as to permit
the removal of all of the parts of an elevator in a building except the
shafts which were bolted to the building walls. 62 In 1942 one com-
mentator found that the only goods a conditional vendor with the
proper priority could not remove were hinges in a door.' In addi-
tion New York developed the "inherent chattels" doctrine which,
briefly stated, is that some chattels, even though affixed to the realty,
remain removable notwithstanding failure to file security interests in
them in the manner required for fixtures. In Madfes v. Beverly
Dev. Corp.,' the New York court retained, after adoption of the
UCSA, the "inherent chattels" doctrine. One outstanding au-
thority on fixtures maintained that this decision abolished all hope of
any real uniformity among the states under section 7 of the UCSA
since, in New York, the conditional vendor would often be protected
even if he failed to file as required by section 7.65 Presumably, the
Code likewise would incorporate this peculiar aspect of New York's
fixture law, thus giving no protection in the form of a filing to future
purchasers of the real estate who might reasonably expect they had
purchased certain classes of goods along with the realty.
III. CONCLUSION
The Code has a series of provisions which relate to fixtures.
Most of the provisions are basically sound in conception, but the Code
does not tell us when the provisions become operative or, in other
words, what is considered a fixture. It is painfully clear from the
previous discussion that the Code cannot successfully prescribe the
application of its fixture provisions by referring to non-Code law.
There are several reasons for this:
(1) The term fixtures is used principally in common law not to
describe a class of property, but rather to express a conclusion that
the rights of one party in an item of property are superior to the
101 See Farnham, upra note 158.
162 Harvard Financial Corp. v. Greenblatt Constr. Co., 261 N.Y. 169, 184 N.E.
748 (1933).
,6 Farnham, supra note 158, at 681 & n.8.
164251 N.Y. 12, 166 N.E. 787 (1929).
16 Niles, supra note 135, at 97 n.181 (1934):
The language [of § 7 of the UCSA] should be broad enough to include
apartment house refrigeration systems, mail chutes, gas stoves in apartment
houses, etc., but the New York courts have read into the section their old
test and definition of fixture, and hence the purpose of the section has been
largely defeated.
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rights of another party. Frequently the conclusion, and hence the
resulting definition of fixture, is derived from a situation where the
issues were quite different from those which arise from a conditional
sale of fixtures under the Code (for example, whether rights of a lessor
are subordinate to those of a lessee or whether the rights of a mort-
gagee or other grantee are superior to those of a grantor, or vice
versa). A decision which made perfectly good sense when the court
was construing a contract between the parties may make no sense at all
where a third party conditional vendor is concerned."6" In some states
the term "fixture" is used very little or not at all in the Code sense,
and a broader question is posed as to whether or not the item in
question has or has not become "part of the realty." A statement that
it has become part of the realty is likewise a conclusion that the rights
of one who claims the item as part of the realty are superior to the
rights of one who claims under chattel law. Further, characterization
of an item as "part of the realty" leaves unanswered the question of
whether the item has been incorporated into a structure, and hence is
never removable under chattel security law, or whether it is only
"affixed" and removable by a secured party who qualifies under sub-
section (5) of section 9-313.
(2) In many states, adoption of the Code makes drastic changes
in the circumstances under which goods which are affixed to the real
estate can be removed by a secured party. These changes are based
upon policy considerations, and are crucial in determining the relative
priority of the parties. These considerations must not be defeated by
reference to a definition of fixtures produced under different policy
objectives.
(3) There is no possibility of achieving a reasonably uniform
operation of article nine if we must rely upon the inconsistent (or
worse, so far as conditional sales are concerned, nonexistent) fixture
law of the individual states.167 A corollary of this is that a reasonable
degree of uniformity brings a reasonable degree of consistency, pres-
ently lacking, both within and between states.
Even though the word fixture is not formally defined in the Code,
the most obvious place to look in order to determine its proper use
166See Colton v. Michigan Lafayette Bldg. Co., 267 Mich. 122, 255 N.W. 433
(1934), in which the court reached the conclusion that elevator operator uniforms
were fixtures. The holding makes sense in light of the contract between the parties
that the court was interpreting, but it would be monstrous to hold that an out-of-
state conditional vendor of clothing is charged with notice that a security interest
in elevator operator uniforms can be protected only by a filing in the realty records.
167 It is worth noting that business equipment and consumer goods are the only
fixtures that present a classification problem.
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is section 9-313 itself. Like other article nine terms used to describe
classes of collateral, the term "fixture" is likely to answer the question
"when" rather than the question "what." 185 Lumber, when held for
sale, is part of the owner's inventory. However, it ceases to be
inventory, and in fact can no longer serve as collateral under any
Code security interest when it is "incorporated into a structure." If
and when converted into a table and sold, it becomes "equipment" 19
of a business debtor who uses it as collateral, or "consumer goods" ""
if bought for family use. The classification of a particular item deter-
mines which of the Code's alternative rules apply. The Code generally
draws reasonably clear lines as to when goods fall into one category
or the other, but the line becomes less clear when, for example, lumber
is made into a removable panel in a place of business or a home and
is affixed to the wall. The difficulty lies in describing the circum-
stances "whether and when" 171 this occurs.
This writer has suggested previously that a court which is inter-
ested could interpret the fixture provisions in accord with the intent
of the draftsmen."' To reach a sensible result, one could begin with
the operative provisions of subsection (5) and read all other pro-
visions in the light of the purpose of this subsection. All parts of
section 9-313 other than subsection (5) merely help to tell when its
removal rights become operative. Fixtures, under this approach, refer
to a class of goods which are affixed to the realty (but not incorporated
into a real estate structure thereon), and can be removed even when
removal results in material injury-either physical or economic-to
the freehold (and consequently to persons having an interest therein).
Subsection (5) merely places on the remover a duty to obtain the
proper section 9-313 priority and to repair any physical damage caused
by removal. Thus subsection (5), when coupled with subsection (2)
(dealing with the priority of the conditional vendor against existing
real estate mortgagees), reverses the pre-Code rule in some states that
the rights of an existing real estate mortgagee were superior to those
of a conditional vendor 73 even if the vendor had made a fixture
108 The one good thing that can be said about the second sentence of § 9-313(1)
is that it recognizes this fact of life.
16 9UNIFoP CoMMERCIAL CODE § 9-109(2).
170 UNIFoRM CoMMERCUc CODE § 9-109(1).
171 UNIFORM CommEcIAL CODE § 9-313(1).
172 Coogan & Clovis, The Uniform Commercial Code and Real Estate Law:
Problems for Both the Real Estate Lawyer and the Chattel Security Lawyer, 38
IND. L.J. 535 (1963). The article is reproduced in expanded form under the same
title in 2 SExcuaR TRAxSACnONS, ch. 16.
173 Clary v. Owen, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 522 (1860). See p. 1207 supra.
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filing.'74 These subsections reverse much pre-Code law as to what
goods can be removed by whom, and against whom. 5
The first sentence of subsection (1) is a limitation on the general
removal rights granted by subsection (5): "The rules of this section
do not apply to goods incorporated into a structure in the manner of
lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work and the like and no
security interest in them exists . . . ." The sentence might con-
ceivably have been made part of subsection (5), but it is probably
better placed where it is,1'7  because it better warns a conditional
vendor that there are circumstances under which no chattel security
interest survives.' Chattel secured parties are forced to accept the
fact that social utility limits their rights to reclaim goods which have
generally lost their identity as fully as those described in this sentence.
Furthermore, this sentence is helpful in its implication, reinforced by
reference to "other goods" in the succeeding sentence, that goods
incorporated into a structure are the only goods which cannot be re-
moved, either unconditionally as chattels or under the conditions
specified in subsection (5). The class of nonremovable goods de-
scribed in subsection (1) is much narrower than those which the
UCSA made nonremovable because their removal would cause material
injury to the freehold.'
In most cases, goods which are made nonremovable by this first
sentence of subsection (1) would, as a practical matter, be made non-
removable by the duty imposed under subsection (5) to repair the
' 74 Waverly Co-op Bank v. Haner, 273 Mass. 477, 173 N.E. 699 (1930).
175 In addition to Massachusetts, see notes 173-174, mipra, these subsections reverse
what may remain of the industrial plant mortgage doctrine of Pennsylvania. See pp.
1200-01 supra. They also reverse the pre-Code rule of New Jersey that a conditional
vendor could not remove as against a prior real estate mortgagee any goods which have
become part of the realty, including equipment necessary for the comfort of tenants,
or goods whose removal would result in loss of security to the earlier real estate
mortgagee. See p. 1219 supra.
176 If this sentence were in subsection (5), it would not prevent creation of a
fixture interest in bricks in a chimney, but would prevent their removal. How such
a security interest could be enforced is not clear. Presumably it would have some
effect in establishing priority to proceeds from the sale of the collateral as a whole,
or in a Chapter X bankruptcy reorganization. It is not too unreasonable to give an
existing real estate mortgagee a veto over the addition of goods so incorporated as
a condition to the right of severance.
17 It can be argued that the second sentence of subsection (1) also serves as a
warning to the conditional vendor as well as acting as a limitation on the removal
rights under subsection (5). However, there is a significant difference between the
two sentences. The first sentence lists the goods to which it applies while the second
sentence refers us to state law, which in many instances does not exist for deter-
mining what is and what is not a fixture in the Code sense of the term. The essential
point is that if the second sentence is read as a limitation on the rest of the fixture
rules the result would be to completely nullify the rules themselves, and therefore,
at least in some states, there would have been no purpose in adopting this part of
the Code.
178 See note 154 supra.
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physical damage caused by removal. In this sense, it can be argued
that the first sentence of subsection (1) is unnecessary. However,
the sentence is important because it takes cognizance of the social
utility in leaving the structure intact rather than relying only on the
economic test of removal. Part of the usefulness of possessing a fixture
interest is the threat to remove; that threat may be too unfair when
it comes to removing aluminum siding on a house.' 9
Since the third sentence of subsection (1) is closely related to the
sentence just discussed, we may jump over the second for the moment.
The third sentence says: "This Act does not prevent creation of an
encumbrance upon fixtures or real estate pursuant to the law applicable
to real estate." While a careless reading of this sentence might lead to
some erroneous conclusions, the sentence itself is strictly correct-it
speaks not of the priority of a fixture encumbrance, but rather of its
creation. If under pre-Code real estate law a furnace installed in a
house benefits an earlier real estate mortgage, that mortgage likewise
attaches to the furnace after passage of the Code, but under subsection
(2) of section 9-313 the real estate interest is subordinate to the in-
terest of a conditional vendor. If the debtor has a forty percent equity
in the furnace, that forty percent equity, and not one hundred percent,
initially falls under the real estate mortgage. As the purchase price is
paid, the real estate mortgagee's junior interest gradually increases
until eventually it becomes the only security interest in the furnace. 80
Section 9-313 necessarily changes those cases which say that under
the state's real estate law certain chattels (other than those covered by
the first sentence of subsection (1)), though sold under a conditional
sales contract, become a nonremovable part of the realty, and thus feed
an earlier real estate mortgage at the expense of the unpaid conditional
vendor. Therefore, the real estate interest in the new item may be
less than it would have been under the pre-Code law of some states.
This brings us to the second sentence of section 9-313(1) which
reads: "The law of this state other than . . . [the Code] determines
whether and when other goods [i.e., other than goods incorporated
into a structure] become fixtures." This sentence is probably the
source of most of the confusion as to when the Code's fixture pro-
visions apply. However, if it is analyzed in context, one can make
some sense out of this example of bad drafting. It should be inter-
179 Cf. American Home Improvement Co. v. Maclver, 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964),
in which the court held a security agreement on siding unconscionable and therefore
invalid under the Code's § 2-302(1).
180 If the secured debt was increased after affixation, the part representing the
increase would be subordinate to the realty interests. UNIFORm COmERCAL CODE
§ 9-313 (3).
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preted as though it read: Except as otherwise provided in this section
9-313, [T]he law of this state other than this Act determines whether
and when other goods become fixtures. Only if construed in this
manner would it be consistent with the aims and policies of section
9-313 as a whole."8 It would be senseless to interpret the second
sentence (or the third) of subsection (1) as a restriction on all the
other provisions of section 9-313.s2 On the other hand, with the
proper qualifications the use of the term "fixtures" in the second
sentence of subsection (1) and again in subsections (2) and (3) may
even help delineate the boundary between fixtures and ordinary
chattels, because indefinite as the term is, its connotation of physical
affixation gives some help in deciding when it is necessary to file for
fixtures.
While the preceding analysis demonstrates that the Code can be
read in a way which will not emasculate it, practitioners cannot be
assured that courts will reach the interpretation argued for above.
There seems to be no doubt that section 9-313 should be revised in
order to insure proper and consistent results. The most obvious place
to begin any effort to amend section 9-313 is the sentence that has
caused the most difficulty,, the second sentence of subsection (1), which
sends us to non-Code law to determine when the Code's fixture pro-
visions apply. This sentence must be deleted. Instead there should
be substituted a reasonably workable definition of fixtures.
It is possible to establish a foundation by defining fixtures in
their most minimal sense of something which is physically affixed to
the realty, but not incorporated therein in the manner referred to in
subsection (1). Beyond that it is difficult, if not impossible, to state
any valid positive definition. Definitions may be negative as well
as positive; section 9-106 defines the important term "general in-
tangibles" by exclusion of other categories, and section 9-109 defines
"equipment" partly by exclusion and partly by inclusion. It is possible,
in this same manner, to define fixtures as those items which are affixed
but are neither incorporated into the structure nor straight chattels.
In order for such a classification to function properly it would be
necessary to draft tight and careful definitions for the two categories
of nonfixtures. In doing so there is much merit in following as much
of the present section 9-313 scheme as we can, particularly because it
has been adopted by about forty jurisdictions. Furthermore, section
181 In some states the concept of a fixture may be expanded by the provisions
of § 9-313(4) and § 9-401(1) which, for the first time, will provide in that state a
mechanism by which notice of a fixture security interest can be given in the realty
records to future realty purchasers.
182 See note 177 supra.
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9-313's defects are curable without disturbing its essential concepts,
which are sounder than those of the other statutes discussed. 83
There is no evidence that section 9-313 was influenced by the
fixture provisions of the current Canadian counterpart of our UCSA,
but it so happens that the strengths of the two acts tend to complement
each other. The Canadian act 8 excludes from its coverage "building
materials," a term rather fully defined in subsection 2 (d), and at a later
point goes on to set out the terms on which a pre-affixation security
interest in fixtures can be preserved after affixation. We might well
redraft subsection (1) of section 9-313, recasting some of the Canadian
language to fit those concepts of section 9-313 which are sound. Sub-
section (1) might then read as follows:
9-313. Security Interests in Fixtures.
(1) The following rules govern the application of this
Article to goods asociated with particular real estate.
(a) Neither the fixture rules nor any other rules
of this Article shall apply to goods after they have become
building materials, and no security interest in them can there-
after exist under this Article. Fixture rules include those of
this section 9-313 and the fixture filing rules of Part 4 of this
Article.
The term building materials includes goods that have
become so incorporated or built into a building that their
removal therefrom would necessarily involve the removal or
destruction of some part of the building and thereby cause
substantial damage to the building apart from the value of
the goods removed, but the term does not include goods that
are severable from the land merely by unscrewing, unbolting,
unclamping or uncoupling, or some other method of discon-
nection, and does not include equipment or consumer goods
installed in a building for use in the carrying on of an in-
dustry or activity where the only substantial damage, apart
from the value of the equipment or consumer goods removed,
that would necessarily be caused to the building in removing
the equipment or consumer goods therefrom is that arising
from the removal or destruction of the bed or casting on or
in which the item is set and the making or enlargement of an
183 The 1915 and 1935 Pennsylvania Acts, discussed at pp. 1198-1205 supra, seem
to have worked reasonably well, but it seems highly artificial to deny that something
affixed has become part of the realty at least for some purposes.
' 84 An Act Respecting Conditiolal Sales of Goods, in 37 PROCEEDINGS OF ANN.
CONFERENCE COMM. ON UNIFORMrrY OF LEGIsrATIoN (1955). Special note should
be given to §§ 2(c), 2(d), and § 14. Also of interest is the narrower statute ap-
plicable only to banks, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 12, § 88 (1952). The writer is greatly
indebted to Professor Jacob Ziegel, College of Law, University of Saskatchewan,
for the opportunity of reading a chapter on fixtures in his forthcoming book on
Canadian chattel security law.
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opening in the walls of the building sufficient for the removal
from the building. Building includes a structure, erection,
or mine, erected or constructed on or in land.
The Canadian act helps us no further, but the third sentence of
what is presently section 9-313(1) of the Code would continue to be
useful as the last sentence in new subdivision (a).
This Act does not prevent creation of an encumbrance
upon fixtures or real estate pursuant to the law applicable to
real estate,
with the addition of a new clause:
but the priorities established by this section shall control
where applicable.
Subdivisions (b) and (c) would then outline the categories of
chattels and fixtures respectively.
(b) The fixture rules do not apply to any collateral
other than equipment or consumer goods, nor to equipment or
consumer goods not physically affixed to the realty, nor to
such goods physically attached only by electrical cords or
temporary water connections, nor do they apply to equipment
physically attached only for a purpose such as reducing
noise or vibration, or holding the equipment in place. Secu-
rity interests in such collateral are covered by sections of
Article 9 other than the fixture rules.
(c) The fixture provisions of this Article apply to
equipment and consumer goods which relate to the function-
ing of the building, for whatever purpose it may be used (as
distinguished from the functioning of particular activities con-
ducted therein), including goods used for plumbing, heating,
air conditioning, refrigeration, sprinkling systems and other
equipment and consumer goods which are customarily physi-
cally affixed to the real estate, not including building materials
referred to in subdivision (a) nor goods attached only for the
purposes set forth in subdivision (b). Notwithstanding the
provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b), such fixture rules apply
to portable buildings other than those required to be regis-
tered or licensed in connection with motor vehicle laws.
These proposed rules eliminate most questions as to whether any
security interest can be retained and should enable a secured party to
determine whether Code fixture rules or nonfixture rules apply in
the great bulk of the cases; no pretense should be made that they
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eliminate all fixture questions, or the occasional need for both fixture
and nonfixture filings on the same collateral.
The proposed amendment can be criticized because, among other
things, it would hold that an electric stove or refrigerator is a freely
removable chattel, but a gas stove or refrigerator can be removed only
on compliance with the fixture provisions of subsection (5).15 This
seemingly incongruous result is the natural consequence of a classifica-
tion which relies in part upon the method and purpose of attachment.
However, the alternatives are even less promising, for they would
hold that an electric space heater attached only by a cord is a fixture
or, on the contrary, that a gas hot air heater is a chattel.""6 Further-
more, the attachment of a modern electric stove is likely not to be
limited to an electric wire but rather to be built in to counters or
walls-it is likely to be affixed. Any approach, whether based upon
method of attachment or functioning relationship with the realty, will
provide seemingly incongruous results. The test of success will be the
ease of predictability and the minimization of such inconsistencies.U
7
The language taken with some modification from the Canadian
act makes fairly clear what is not a fixture because it is affixed too
much ("building materials incorporated . . . into a building"), and
the new subdivision (b) tells us what is not a fixture because it is not
sufficiently affixed (remains a chattel). Subdivision (c) supplements
both by establishing a class called "fixtures" which includes equipment
and consumer goods not covered by subdivisions (a) and (b). It also
includes an enumerated list of fixtures so that there will be a more
specific understanding of its intent. While grey areas will continue
to exist after this revision, there seems no doubt that they will be much
smaller than before.
One might still ask whether a modern building elevator is in-
corporated into a building or merely affixed thereto. 88 From the con-
ditional vendor's point of view the amount involved may justify a
demand that the debtor obtain for him a severance agreement executed
and filed under real estate law. Of course a severance agreement can-
not always be obtained, and even if it can, the debtor is forced to finance
in a manner that is acceptable to the realty interests. On the other
185 Assuming, of course, that each had only the minimum attachment to the realty.
186As a matter of policy it may be more appropriate to modify §§ 9-302(1) (c)
and (d) in order to exempt low price (for instance, up to $1,000) purchase security
interests in fixtures for farm equipment and consumer goods.
187 It is not difficult, for example, to distinguish between a portable dishwasher
or clothes washer attached temporarily by a hose which can be disconnected by any
amateur and a gas stove or a kitchen sink.
188 Compare Harvard Financial Corp. v. Greenblatt Constr. Co., 261 N.Y. 169,
184 N.E. 748 (1933), with Medical Tower Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 104 F.2d 133
(3d Cir. 1939).
UNIFORMITY IN FIXTURES
hand, perhaps items such as elevators, which are likely to cause the
most confusion, should be dealt with specifically in the Code on a
state-by-state basis. By dealing with particular problems in this way,
the Code will notify all parties, resident and nonresident, of their
rights before they commit themselves to a business transaction. Prac-
tically, this approach would also make the proposed changes more
acceptable to real estate interests. While complete uniformity is
sacrificed to the extent that these items are treated differently by the
states, the advantages are that each particular case would be far
clearer, the state-by-state variations more explicit, and the general
result more uniform than our present treatment, which has been re-
jected in two important commercial states.'8 9
While it is clear under the proposed amendment that a fixture
interest can be preserved in heating, plumbing, and air conditioning
equipment, it is also clear that such equipment comes with the building
unless a fixture filing gives notice to the contrary. The courts will no
longer have to make the all-or-nothing choice that is inherent in a
straight personal property-real property dichotomy, and therefore they
will be much more inclined to hold that the conditional vendor could
have protected himself by a fixture filing against a subsequent real
estate interest, and that by not taking advantage of this privilege he
has lost his priority rights."°
189 See pp. 1212-13 supra (Ohio); pp. 1215-16 supra (California).
190 There have been legitimate complaints on the part of real estate interests
that the Code's notice provisions are not quite satisfactory. The notice requirements
and the definition of a fixture are related to the extent that greater certainty as to
what constitutes a fixture will make the present notice provisions more meaningful.
However, there seems to be at least one area in which the notice, provisions could
operate more effectively. We could adopt the Canadian requirement that the con-
ditional vendor must notify the real estate interests prior to removing the fixture,
and the real estate interests would then have the option of retaining the goods upon
paying the amount owed by the defaulting debtor.
